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This Note will address the various avenues along which the reparation recipients might pur-
sue the vindication of their right to reparations. Part I will provide background information on
the Dirty War, reconciliation process, reparation laws and the economic events that resulted in Ar-
gentina’s sovereign debt crisis. Part I will also describe the various sources of law both domestic
and international upholding the right to reparations. Part II will explore the various cases that have
interpreted this right and the implications they have on the reparation recipients’ possible reme-




AN ANALYSIS OF CONTINUING OBLIGATIONS
Christina M. Wilson*
INTRODUCTION
Born in 1925, Elsa Oesterheld grew up an only child in Ar-
gentina.1 She married a comic book scriptwriter and had four
daughters who, in 1976, were all married and ranged in age
from eighteen to twenty-three.2 Two of her daughters were
pregnant and the other two had children.' Within months, they
were all gone.4 The military abducted her husband, her four
daughters, and two of her sons-in-law, leaving Elsa to raise her
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Article is dedicated to the disappeared.
1. See Marcela Valente, Argentina: Belated Reparations for Victims of the Dictatorship,
INTER PRESS SERVICE, Feb. 7, 1997, at http://www.ips.org [hereinafter Valente, Belated
Reparations] (explaining that Elsa Oesterheld's parents had been delighted with large
family from their only daughter). See generally Larry Robhter, Argentine Default Reopens
"Dirty War" Wounds, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 2002, at A3 (describing situation of recipients
of reparations bonds in context of economic crisis).
2. See Valente, Belated Reparations, supra note I (explaining that all four daughters
were married and pursuing university careers); see also Rohter, supra note 1, at A3 (stat-
ing that all four daughters were students with leftist sympathies).
3. See Valente, Belated Reparations, supra note 1 (stating that raising two surviving
grandchildren alone kept her so busy that she had little time to console her despondent
parents who died incapable of comprehending tragedy that had destroyed their fam-
ily); see also Rohter, supra note 1, at A3 (describing how two surviving grandsons, Martin
Mortola Oesterheld, 27, and Fernando Araldi Oesterheld, 26, filed separate claims for
reparations and vowed to reserve portion of it for lost child of Mrs. Oesterheld's young-
est daughter Marina, who was allegedly born in captivity).
4. See Valente, Belated Reparations, supra note 1 (asserting that military took her
family, her home, and even royalties from her husband's work); see also Rohter, supra
note 1, at A3 (describing how her husband and all four daughters and two sons-in-law
disappeared).
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two grandchildren on her own.' The military targeted Elsa's
husband in part fbr authoring a comic book version of the life of
Che Guevara.6 The military imprisoned him for at least a year
before he disappeared; the time of Elsa's daughters' detention
before their disappearance remains unknown.7 Another such
victim was Sebastian Garcia-Albores, whose father disappeared in
1979.8 Elsa and Sebastian represent two of 7000 victims of the
"Dirty War"9 who applied to receive reparations for Dirty War
crimes in 1996.10
5. See Valente, Belated Reparations, supra note 1 (stating that she survived by her own
volition despite hardship of raising grandchildren by herself); see also Rohter, supra note
1, at A3 (explaining how those most affected by devaluation of bonds are most vulnera-
ble sectors of society, aging retirees, and young grandchildren of disappeared).
6. See Valente, Belated Reparations, supra note 1 (explaining that she had warned her
husband that if he wrote comic book about life of Che Guevara, military would label
him communist, comment which he laughed off); see also Rohter, supra note 1, at A3
(describing how her husband had gone underground after writing Che book and arous-
ing suspicions of junta due to his sympathies with left-wing Montonero guerillas). The
word junta means an autonomous government, often a military government when used
in Latin America. See OXFORD SPANISH DICTIONARY 441 (1994) (defining junta as auton-
omous government); see also WEST'S SPANISH-ENGLISH/ ENGLISH-SPANISH LAW DICTION-
ARY 194 (1992) (defining junta as board or representative group created to carry on
specific purpose assigned to them).
7. See Valente, Belated Reparations, supra note 1 (noting that his imprisonment time
before disappearance was one year); see also Rohter, supra note 1, at A3 (stating that
period of detention of Mrs. Oesterheld's daughters before their death remains un-
known).
8. See David Plumb & Daniel Helft, Argentina's "Dirty War" Victims Are Losers in De-
fault, BLOOMBERG NEWS, Dec. 7, 2001 (describing how Sebastian Garcia-Albores lost his
father during the Dirty War in 1979).
9. This Note will use the phrase "Dirty War" to refer to period of military rule from
1976-1983. This phrase is objectionable because it inaccurately implies that casualties
were primarily armed combatants, whereas many desaparecidos [disappeared] were not
involved in armed insurrection at all. See, e.g., MARTIN EDWIN ANDERSON, DOSSIER
SECRETO, ARGENTINA'S DESAPARECIDOS AND M,,rH OF "DIRTY WAR" 2 (1993) (arguing that
use of phrase Dirty War implies that casualties came from ranks of two real armies,
which was not true in Argentina); see also Tim Dockery, The Rule of Law Over the Law of
Rulers: The Treatment of De Fact Laws in Argentina, 19 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1578, 1604-05
(1996) (describing how repression of this era differed from earlier repressive regimes
in that it involved indiscriminate violations of human rights against anyone perceived as
threatening).
10. See Valente, Belated Reparations, supra note 1 (noting that Elsa was 72 when she
applied to receive reparations bonds and looked forward to comfort of knowing that
her grandchildren and great-grandson would have what they needed); see also Plumb &
Helft, supra note 8 (describing how Sebastian Garcia-Albores lost his father during the
Dirty War in 1979, and quoting Tomas Ojea, chief legal council to Argentina's Under-
secretary of Human Rights, as asserting that as of December 2001, 9000 families were
awaiting approval of their petitions for reparations, totaling, if approved, at least an-
other U.S.$1 billion of bonds).
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Beginning in 1991, the Argentine government, at the time
headed by President Carlos Menem, paid reparations in the
form of bonds worth between U.S.$220,000 and U.S.$256,000
for each disappeared person." An economic crisis erupted in
December 2001, however, and the Menem Administration de-
cided to suspend payments of interest and principle on these
bonds. 2 During the initial phases of the economic crisis, the
government pressured reparation bond recipients to accept
loans with lower values.13
Those that did not participate in the loan swap watched the
11. See Valente, Belated Reparations, supra note I (explaining that law governing
reparations provides for compensation in form of bonds worth U.S.$220,000 per each
disappeared person); see also Rohter, supra note 1, at A3 (stating that bonds issued were
worth up to U.S.$256,000 as restitution for each death); Decreto de Necesidad y Urgencia
Sobre Beneficios Para Detenidos a Disposicidn del Poder Ejecutivo Nacional Durante La Vigilencia
del Estado de Sitio [Decree of Necessity and Urgency Regarding Benefits for Those De-
tained at Disposition of Executive National Power During State of Emergency], Law No.
70/91,Jan. 16, 1991, B.O. (establishing that statute of limitations did not bar families of
Dirty War victims' claims); Beneficios Ortorgados a Personas Puestas a Disposicidn del Poder
Ejecutivo Nacional Durante el Estado de Sitio [Benefits Granted to People Held at Disposi-
tion of Executive National Power During the State of Emergency] Law No. 24.043,Jan.
2, 1992, B.O. (creating broad criteria of proof for establishing forced disappearance
and torture); Desaparicirn Fozada de Personas [Forced Disappearance of People], Law
No. 24.321, June 8, 1994, B.O. (providing legal recognition of special status of disap-
peared in Argentina); Ausencia por Desaparicidn Forzada [Absence due to Forced Disap-
pearance], Law No. 24.411,Jan. 3, 1995, B.O. (extending reparation benefits to com-
mon law marriages in existence at least two years prior to disappearance or death).
12. See Rohter, supra note 1, at A3 (explaining that Argentine government sus-
pended payments of interest and principal on these bonds as well as other foreign and
domestic debts); see also Plumb & Helft, supra note 8 (explaining that in 2001 govern-
ment was pressuring recipients to accept lower value on their bonds as part of its at-
tempt to lighten its U.S.$132 billion debt and many were accepting due to likelihood of
governmental default on all its debt); INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND ["IMF"], INDEPEN-
DENT EVALUATION OFFICE ["lEO"], REPORT ON THE EVALUATION OF THE ROLE OF THE IMF
IN ARGENTINA, 1991-2001 6 (2004) [hereinafter IMF, lEO] (describing how in Decem-
ber 2001, government defaulted on its sovereign debt); Argentina Creditors Unite to Speed
up Bond Talks, ANSA ENG. MEDIA SERV., Jan. 12, 2004 (describing how in response to
Argentina's default totaling 54 and 55 billion principal private and institutional credi-
tors created International Committee of Argentine Bondholders ("GCAB") to spur Ar-
gentine government into negotiation).
13. See Plumb & Helft, supra note 8 (quoting reparations recipient who felt
trapped by government pressure because he did not understand anything about bond
market); see also IMF, IEO, supra note 12, at 93 (describing how on November 1, 2001,
government announced two-part debt exchange, Part I of which pressured domestic
creditors to exchange old credit for guaranteed loans with lower interest rates and
longer maturities); Christopher Faille, Second Circuit Finds Ambiguity in ISDA Documents
Re: Argentina, HEDGEWORLD / INSIDE EDGE, July 20, 2004 (describing how in litigation
arising out of Argentina's late 2001 bond default, plaintiff will argue that Argentina's
proposed debt exchange of November 1, 2001, was regarded by bondholders as coer-
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value of their bonds depreciate radically because the govern-
ment chose to float 4 the Argentine peso.15 For example, the
bonds Garcia-Albores received for his father's disappearance in
1979 lost seventy percent of their value, dropping from
U.S.$87,000 to U.S.$25,000.' 6 Reparations recipients like Garcia-
Albores still hoped the government would give these bonds
greater priority because of the special circumstances surround-
ing their issuance.1 7 As the economic crisis deepened, however,
the government decided to suspend interest and principal pay-
ments on its internal and external debt, including the repara-
tions bonds, forcing families of the disappeared like Garcia-Al-
bores and Oesterheld into financial difficulty.1 8
cive and constituted mandatory transfer of securities as referred to in language of Inter-
national Swaps and Derivatives Association agreements).
14. A Floated Exchange Rate is one that is market driven, where supply and de-
mand determines the currency's value. See, e.g., The Economist Group Asia-Pacific Lim-
ited, Economic Definitions, 2001, at http://www.economistconferences.com/PeerGroup/
GroupMeeting/Research/PG12-RES-2072.pdf (last visited Apr. 22, 2005); see also BAR-
RON'S BUSINESS GUIDES DICTIONARY OF BANKING TERMS 258 (1990).
15. See IMF, lEO, supra note 12, at 6, 160 (describing how convertibility regime was
created in 1991 as stabilization device in response to hyperinflation problems of early
19 9 0s and how Argentine authorities suspended convertibility regime on January 6,
2002, causing value of Argentine peso and government bonds to plummet); see also
Marcela Valente, Argentina: Reparations for Banks, But Not Savers, IPS-INTER PRESS SERV.,
Mar. 4, 2003, available at http://www.ips.org [hereinafter Valente, Reparations for Banks]
(describing how, in January 2002, President Eduardo Duhalde's government lifted par-
ity regime that had pegged Argentine peso to U.S. dollar for decade resulting in sharp
devaluation of Argentine peso); Plumb & Helft, supra note 8 (noting that market prices
of bonds dropped rapidly); Argentina Faces Restructuring Challenge, FIN. TIMES INVESTOR,
GLOBAL NEWS WIRE - EUR. INTELLIGENCE WIRE, Mar. 5, 2003 (describing how Argen-
tina's default was biggest and most complex sovereign debt default to date).
16. See Faille, supra note 13 (stating that Argentina began defaulting on its bonds
via series of moves on November 1); see also Plumb & Helft, supra note 8 (stating that
some recipients held onto bonds rather than swap for new lower value loans because
there's secondary market for bonds).
17. See Plumb & Helft, supra note 8 (arguing that recipients of reparations bonds
have distinct history from other bondholders); see also Rohter, supra note 1, at A3 (quot-
ing lawyer representing families of disappeared explaining that reparations recipients
are not normal investors but victims of crimes); NAT'L OMBUDSMAN, DEFENSOR DEL
PUEBLO DE LA NACI6N, INFORME ANNUAL 2002 38-40 (2002) [hereinafter NAT'L
OMBUDSMAN, DEFENSOR] (urging Argentine Minister of Economy to lift suspension of
payments on reparation bonds because suspending them constituted violation of Amer-
ican Convention and regression in development of human rights). But see Valente, Repa-
rations for Banks, supra note 15 (describing how Argentine government is planning on
providing reparations for banks but not for individuals adversely affected by crisis).
18. See Faille, supra note 13 (stating that Argentina defaulted on its bonds via series
of moves beginning on November 1, 2001, and culminating in public-debt moratorium
announced December 24, 2001); see also Paivi Munter, Taking Action Against World's Big-
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Oesterheld's and Garcia-Albores' bonds, like all other Ar-
gentine government bonds, are part of the most complex sover-
eign debt crisis in history.19 Yet, they and the other reparation
recipients are different from other bondholders who chose to
invest in the Argentine State. 20 The reparations recipients re-
ceived the bonds as reparations for the atrocities committed dur-
ing the Dirty War in accordance with domestic and international
gest Default; Suing Is an Option for Only a Handful of Those Hit in Argentina's Bond Issue, FIN.
TIMEs, Jan. 12, 2004, available at 2004 WLNR 7607593 (stating that for many bond hold-
ers only options are either joining with others to influence debt restructuring or selling
bonds at current market price); Rohter, supra note 1, at A3 (explaining that Argentine
government's decision to suspend interest and principal payments on its debts extends
to and creates great hardship for reparations recipients); Marcela Valente, Argentina:
Small Creditors to Open Talks on Defaulted Debt, IPS-INTER PRESS SERV., Mar. 23, 2004, avail-
able at http://www.ips.org [hereinafter Valente, Small Creditors] (describing how associa-
tion of Argentine bond-holders is contesting Argentina's decision to prioritize paying
debts to multilateral credit institutions instead of paying more vulnerable local individu-
als). But see Lionel Barber et al., International Investors Cy for Argentina's Bond Crisis to Be
Resolved Quickly and Fairly, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 8, 2004, available at 2004 WLNR 9722561
(describing how majority of 40,000Japanese investors who bought Argentine bonds are
elderly individuals or small associations who invested large portion of their assets).
19. See Ronald J. Silverman & Mark W. Deveno, Distressed Sovereign Debt: A Creditor's
Perspective, 11 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REv. 179, 179-91 (2003) (explaining recent trends in
sovereign financing, away from syndicated bank loans toward great reliance on sover-
eign bonds held by large number of creditors with varying concerns and interests, have
rendered resolution of sovereign debt crisis via litigation impractical); see also Week 's Top
Story - Government Gets 75% Reduction In Its Debt Capita4 NOTIctAs FINANCIERAS, Sept.
26, 2003 (describing that Argentina's December 2001 default created most complex
restructuring in history due to numerous and diverse nature of bondholders); Hugo
Alconada Mon, Los Acreedores, con Actitudes Muy Dispares [Creditors, with Very Varied
Attitudes], LA NACION LINE, July 7, 2003, at § Economfa (stating that holders of Argen-
tine bonds are from different countries and vary greatly in their response to debt crisis,
with some favoring lawsuits, and others more conciliatory approach); Elisabetta Pigu6,
Crearan un super comite de bonistas [Creating a Super Committee of Bondholders], LA
NACON (Arg.), Jan. 10, 2004 (describing efforts amongst Italian bondholders to create
super committee to negotiate against Argentina's proposed reduction).
20. See Rohter, supra note 1, at A3 (quoting lawyer representing families of disap-
peared explaining that as victims of State sponsored terrorism, rather than investors,
reparation recipients should not be treated as ordinary creditors); see also Valente, Small
Creditors, supra note 18 (stating that one reparations recipient who lost her husband in
the kidnappings of Dirty War joined association of small-bondholders who seek to be
treated differently from corporate bondholders); NAT'L OMBUDSMAN, DEFENSOR, supra
note 17, at 39 (urging Argentine government to begin repayment of reparation bonds
in order to acknowledge most absolute obligation owed to victims of Dirty War). But see
Stephen Temple, Argentina Fails to Persuade US Court to Block Bondholder Claims, WORLD
MARKETS ANALYSIS, Jan. 16, 2004 (describing how Argentine bond covenant had pari
passu [impartiality] clause for treatment of all creditors which would only be considered
once claims have actually been filed by plaintiffs not preemptively as Argentina had
sought).
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law, not because they invested in Argentina.2"
Due to their unique status, Oesterheld, Garcia-Albores and
the other reparation recipients have several avenues for a rem-
edy.22 First, they could try to sue within the Argentine domestic
legal system based on the Argentine Constitution.23 Second,
they could bring an action under international law before an in-
ternational tribunal to fulfill the right to receive reparations. 24
Third, they could sue in an extra-territorial proceeding like
those possible under the Alien Tort Claims Act ("ATCA") in the
United States. 25 Finally, the reparation bondholders could seek
21. See Valente, Belated Reparations, supra note I (explaining that reparations laws
provide compensation for each disappeared person); see also Rohter, supra note 1, at A3
(stating that bonds issued were restitution for deaths of disappeared).
22. See, e.g., Temple, supra note 20 (describing how, since Argentina's default,
most bond-holders have stayed away from litigation preferring to seek out-of-court set-
tlement, though tiny minority of bondholders have resorted to litigation); ANSA ENG.
MEDIA SERV., supra note 12 (describing how some bondholders are not resorting to
legal action but are negotiating in good faith with Argentina); Munter, supra note 18
(stating that for majority of investors in Argentine bonds taking government to court is
not option, rather they must either join forces with other bondholders or sell bonds at
current market prices); FIN. TIMES INVESTOR, GLOBAL NEWS WIRE - EUR. INTELLIGENCE
WIRE, supra note 15 (asserting that Philip Poole, an emerging markets researcher for
ING Financial Markets, predicted in March 2003 that final debt restructuring agree-
ments would leave investors with twelve to fifteen U.S. cents on each U.S. dollar); H.W.
Urban v. Republic of Argentina, 2004 WIL 307293 (S.D.N.Y.) (granting class action for
class consisting of all holders of two U.S. bond series and acknowledging that H.W.
Urban now seeks to expand class to include all bondholders including Argentine citi-
zens); EM Ltd. v. The Republic of Argentina, 382 F.3d 291 (2d Cir. 2004) (considering
case in which bondholder sued Argentina for repayment in U.S. dollars rather than
Argentine pesos following default).
23. See, e.g., CONST. ARC. pt. I, ch. I, § 17 (1994), translated at http://www.hrcr.org/
docs/ArgentineConst/Preamble.html/web/constitucion/english.html (establishing
that property may not be violated except by virtue of sentence based on law and that
expropriation for public interest must be authorized by law and previously compen-
sated); see alsoJONATHAN M. MILLER ET AL., CONSTITUC16N Y DERECHOS HUMANOS 1223
(1991) (exploring property rights in Argentina under Article 17 of Argentine Constitu-
tion).
24. See, e.g., In re Veldsquez Rodriguez, [1998] Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 4,
174 (holding that victims' torture and disappearance should be fairly compensated);
Dinah Shelton, TheJurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 10 AM. U. J.
INT'L L & POL'Y 333, 362 (1994) (discussing Inter-American Court's contribution of
establishing remedies, including right to receive reparations); Diane F. Orentlicher,
Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights Violators of a Prior Regime, 100 YALE
L.J. 2537 (1991) (describing how Inter-American Convention on Human Rights Article
1 (1) has been interpreted to require that victims receive adequate compensation); In-
ternational Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, pt.
III, art. 9(5) [hereinafter ICCPR] (providing for compensation to victims of unlawful
arrest or detention).
25. See Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1993) (creating original jurisdic-
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a remedy via the complex and changing field of sovereign debt
resolution.26
This Note will address the various avenues along which the
reparation recipients might pursue the vindication of their right
to reparations. Part I will provide background information on
the Dirty War, reconciliation process, reparation laws and the
economic events that resulted in Argentina's sovereign debt cri-.
sis. Part I will also describe the various sources of law both do-
mestic and international upholding the right to reparations.
Part II will explore the various cases that have interpreted this
right and the implications they have on the reparation recipi-
ents' possible remedies. Part III will analyze which of these rem-
edies seems most likely to yield a favorable result for the repara-
tion recipients.
I. THE BACKGROUND OF THE REPARATIONS BONDS AND
THE LEGAL SOURCES FOR REMEDY
The Argentine Government passed reparations laws as part
of the reconciliation process following the Dirty War.27 It sus-
tion in U.S. district court for U.S. non-citizens bringing civil tort actions that violate law
of Nations); see also Filartiga v. Pefia-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 878 (2d Cir. 1980) (resolving
case brought by citizens of Paraguay against person allegedly responsible for torture
and disappearance of their son).
26. See Silverman & Deveno, supra note 19 (describing how change in composition
of sovereign debt creditors makes both voluntary restructuring and litigation more
complex due to diversity of interests represented by bondholders); see also Pigut, supra
note 19 (illustrating efforts of Italian bondholders negotiate against Argentina's pro-
posed reduction). See generally Horst Kohler, Opening Remarks for the Sovereign Debt
Restructuring Mechanism Conference, Jan. 22, 2003, available at http://www.imf.orq/
external/np/speeches/2003/012203.htm (describing alternative proposals under con-
sideration); The Design of the Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism-Further Considerations
(2002), available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/pdr/sdrm/2002/112702.pdf (last
visited Mar. 3, 2005) (describing provisions of proposal including provisions regarding
voting, and describing creation of Sovereign Debt Dispute Resolution Forum ("SD-
DRF")); Ann Pettifor, Resolving International Debt Crises - the Jubilee Framework for Interna-
tional Insolvency (Jan. 2002), at http://www.jubilee2000uk.org/analysis/reports/jubi-
leeframework.html (last visited Mar. 3, 2005) (describing proposal based on Chapter
Nine involving ad hoc dispute resolution committees); Barbara Samuels, Counsel on For-
eign Relations: Key Recommendations from the Roundtable on Country Risk in the Post-Asia
Crisis Era (on file with author) (describing proposals discussed at roundtable concern-
ing sovereign debt); Silverman & Deveno, supra note 19, at 191-95 (describing how, at
annual meeting of World Bank and IMF in September 2002, International Monetary
and Financial Committee ("IMFC") requested that IMF develop framework for sover-
eign debt).
27. See Valente, Belated Reparations, supra note 1 (explaining that law governing
reparations provides for compensation in form of bonds for each disappeared person);
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pended payments on the reparation bonds during the economic
crisis. 28 Thus, the obligation owed to the reparation recipients is
outstanding. 29  Domestic, extraterritorial, and international
sources of law provide various avenues through which Garcia-
Albores, Oesterheld, and the other reparation recipients might
seek a remedy for this unfulfilled right to receive reparations. °
A. Background on the Reparation Bonds
The Argentine government issued the reparation bonds as
part of a complex response to the Dirty War and its legacies." 1
Furthermore, the economic and sovereign debt crisis had the
effect of dramatically altering the value of the reparation
bonds.32 An exploration of both of these areas is necessary to
see also Rohter, supra note 1, at A3 (stating that bonds issued in restitution for each
death).
28. See Faille, supra note 13 (stating that Argentina defaulted on its bonds via series
of moves beginning on November 1, 2001, and culminating in public-debt moratorium
announced December 24, 2002); see also IMF, IEO, supra note 12, at 6 (describing how,
in December 2001, Argentine government defaulted on its sovereign debt).
29. See Plumb & Helft, supra note 8 (arguing that recipients of reparations bonds
have distinct history from other bondholders); see also Rohter, supra note 1, at A3 (quot-
ing lawyer representing families of disappeared explaining that reparations recipients
are not normal investors but victims of crimes).
30. See, e.g., CoNsT. ARG. pt. I, ch. I, § 17 (1994) (establishing property rights); In
re Veldsquez Rodriguez, [1998] Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 4, at 174 (holding
that, under American Convention, victims' torture and disappearance should be fairly
compensated); Orentlicher, supra note 24 (describing how Inter-American Convention
on Human Rights Article 1 (1) has been interpreted to require that victims receive ade-
quate compensation); ICCPR, supra note 24, art. 9(5) (creating right to compensation
for victims of unlawful arrest or detention and creating jurisdiction for then to sue in
district courts for torts in violation of law of Nations); Filartiga v. Pefia-Irala, 630 F.2d
876, 878 (2d Cir. 1980) (resolving case in U.S. District Court brought by citizens of
Paraguay against non-U.S. citizen allegedly responsible for torture and disappearance
of their son).
31. See Valente, Belated Reparations, supra note 1 (explaining that law governing
reparations provides for compensation in form of bonds for each disappeared person);
see also Rohter, supra note 1, at A3 (stating that bonds issued in restitution for each
death); Law No. 70/91, supra note 11 (establishing that statute of limitations did not
bar families of Dirty War victims' claims); Law No. 24.043, supra note 11, arts. 1-2 (creat-
ing wide criteria of proof for establishing forced disappearance and torture); Law No.
24.321, supra note 11, art. 2 (providing legal recognition of special status of disappeared
in Argentina); Law No. 24.411, supra note 11, art. 4 (extending reparation benefits to
common law marriages in existence at least two years prior to disappearance or death).
32. See Rohter, supra note 1, at A3 (explaining that Argentine government decided
to suspend interest and principal payments on its debts including reparation bonds); see
also Faille, supra note 13 (stating that Argentina defaulted on its bonds via series of
moves beginning on November 1 and culminating in public-debt moratorium an-
nounced December 24); Week's Top Story - Government Gets 75% Reduction in its Debt
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thoroughly analyze the remedies open to reparation recipients,
and to determine which remedies would most likely yield a
meaningful result.33
1. Argentina's Years of "Dirty War"
The horrific years of the Dirty War in Argentina lasted from
1976 to 1983 and resulted in 15,000 to 30,000 civilian deaths.3 4
A succession of four juntas, each composed of three senior of-
ficers, controlled the administration of government during the
military regime. During the Dirty War, the military (as part of
its war against leftist subversives), kidnapped, tortured, and exe-
cuted civilians perceived to have leftist connections.3 6 Society
called those abducted by the military regime at this time los
Capital supra note 19 (describing that Argentina's December 2001 default created most
complex restructuring in history due to numerous and diverse nature of bondholders).
33. See Barber et al., supra note 18 (describing various bond holders' responses to
sovereign debt crisis); see also Mon, supra note 19 (stating that some holders of Argen-
tine bonds favor lawsuits while others favor more conciliatory approach); Munter, supra
note 18 (describing options of eitherjoining with others to influence debt restructuring
or selling bonds at current market price); Valente, Small Creditors, supra note 18
(describing reaction of association of Argentine bondholders).
34. See Terence S. Coonan, Dedicated to Las Madres de la Plaza de Mayo: Rescuing
History: Legal and Theological Reflections on the Task of Making Former Torturers Accountable,
20 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 512, 516 (1996) (asserting that Argentina in years from 1976 to
1983 endured one of most brutal dictatorships in Latin American history); see also Dock-
ery, supra note 9 (stating that repression of 1976-1983 involved indiscriminate violations
of human rights against anyone perceived as threatening); David Weissbrodt & Maria
Luisa Bartolomei, The Effectiveness of International Human Rights Pressures: The Case of
Argentina, 1976-1983, 75 MINN. L. REv. 1009 n.15 (1991) (explaining divergence in
number of disappeared ranging from 30,000, as reported by most Argentine nongov-
ernmental organizations, to 12,000-15,000 estimates cited by Americas Watch and Am-
nesty International).
35. See MARGUERITE FEITLOWITZ, A LEXICON OF TERROR; ARGENTINA AND LEGACIES
OF TORTURE 8 (1998) (describing that, of four juntas, first one, headed by President
General Rafael Videla, Admiral Emilio Eduardo Massera, and Brigadier General Or-
lando R. Agosti, was most repressive, resulting in majority of disappearances); see also
Familiares de Desaparecidos y Detenidos Por Razones Politicas [Relatives of the Disap-
peared and Detained for Political Reasons], ABOGADOS DESAPARECIDOS REP. ARGENTINA
37-165 (1988) (describing dates and names of disappeared lawyers); RiCARDO RODRI-
GUEZ MoLAs, HISTORIA DE LA TORTURA v EL ORDEN REPRESIVO EN LA ARGENTINA 150-169
(1985) (exploring history of torture and repression in Argentina).
36. See La Comisi6n Nacional Sobre la Desaparici6n de Personas (CONADEP),
NUNCA MAs: THE REPORT OF THE ARGENTINE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE DIsAP-
PEARED (describing how military regime kidnapped those they felt to be threats to Ar-
gentine State); see also Coonan, supra note 34, at 517 (explaining that Dirty War was
designed to eradicate left-wing subversion); Dockery, supra note 9, at 1604 (describing
that junta repressed anyone viewed as even mild threat).
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desaparecidos,3 7 or "the disappeared," because the authorities de-
nied all knowledge of their whereabouts and their families were
never able to find their bodies." Following the fall of the mili-
tary regime, newly elected Argentine President Alfonsin ordered
the formation of the National Commission on the Disappeared
("Commission") to investigate and report on the crimes of the
Dirty War.3 9 The Commission was one of the first of its kind in
South America, and published Nunca Mds, detailing the policies
and strategies of the successive juntas.4"
2. Reconciliation
The democratic government that followed the Dirty War ad-
dressed a difficult reconciliation process.4 Though Alfonsin
37. The word desaparecido means missing, late or deceased. See OXFORD SPANISH
DICTIONARY 238 (1994).
38. See NUNCA MAs, supra note 36, at xiii-xiv.
Watchful Argentines soon discovered what a dirty war was. People - mainly,
but not only young people - began to disappear in great numbers. They
were swept off the street, or from their homes in the middle of the night, by
squads in plain clothes, and bundled into the trunks of the Ford Falcons with
no license plates these squads drove. Most were never seen again. When des-
perate parents or friends sought information from the police or the military,
they were told authorities had no knowledge of who had taken the victim or
where he or she was. Some relatives hired lawyers to bring actions of habeas
corpus in the courts. But almost all these actions were dismissed.., and the
lawyers who brought the actions began to disappear themselves.
Id. at xiii-xiv. See Julia K. Boyle, The International Obligation to Prosecute Human
Rights Violators: Spain's Jurisdiction over Argentine Dirty War Participants, 22 HAS-
TINGS INT'L & COMp. L. REv. 187, 189 (1998) (describing war against anyone perceived
by junta as subversive which claimed, according to human rights groups, at least 30,000
lives between 1976 and 1983); see also Weissbrodt & Bartolomei, supra note 34, at 1012
(explaining that over 80% of those killed were between ages of 21 and 40).
39. See FEITLOWITZ, supra note 35, at 63-89 (asserting junta's policy of "disappear-
ing" people was reminiscent of Hitler's decree of December 7, 1941, prescribing that
prisoners should vanish in night and fog, "nacht und nebel"); see also Coonan, supra note
34, at 519-20 (explaining that Comisi6n Nacional Sobre la Desaparici6n de Personas
[National Commission on the Disappearance of Persons] ("CONADEP") compiled
50,000 pages of documentation illustrating organization and methods used by junta in
carrying out disappearances); Carlos S. Nino, The Duty to Punish Past Abuses of Human
Rights Put Into Context: The Case of Argentina, 100 YALE L.J. 2619, 2623 (1991) (asserting
that CONADEP was comprised of independent respected citizens who had full powers
of investigation).
40. See NUNCA MAS, supra note 36 (describing atmosphere of disappearance and
fear during Dirty War); see also Coonan, supra note 34, at 521 (describing how
CONADEP's release of NUNCA MAs served as model for subsequent truth commissions
in Latin America).
41. See Andrew S. Brown, Adi6s Amnesty: Prosecution Discretion and Militay Trials in
Argentina, 37 TEX. INT'L L.J. 203, 210-16 (2002) (providing background to Argentina's
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prosecuted some military leaders involved in the Dirty War
crimes, pressure from the military led to a halt of such prosecu-
tions,42 and then, under Menem, a pardon for all convicted of
crimes from the era of the Dirty War.4' The families injured
from the crimes committed, however, were not left without a
remedy.44
reconciliation process, promulgation of Amnesty Laws and their subsequent annul-
ment); see also Orentlicher, supra note 24, at 2545 n.27 (exploring example of Argen-
tina's transition to democracy while arguing for establishment of specific duty to punish
crimes of former regimes). But see Nino, supra note 39, at 2624-26 (arguing that duty
created under international law to punish and prosecute previous Dirty War crimes
would not have to overcome all factors that made such action impossible in context of
Argentina's fragile transitional democracy).
42. See La Ley de Punto Final [Full Stop Law], Law No. 23.492, Dec. 29, 1986, B.O.
(halting prosecution of Dirty War crimes); see also La Ley de Obedencia Debida [Due Obe-
dience Law], Law No. 23.521, June 9, 1987, B.O. (removing from prosecution officers
that were only following orders); Coonan, supra note 34, at 522 (providing that Punto
Final Law created sixty-day limiting period after which no new charges related to State-
sponsored crimes could be brought and that Obedencia Debida Law created irrebutable
presumption of innocence for soldiers following orders during period of Dirty War);
Orentlicher, supra note 24, at 2544-45 (identifying argument that fragile democracies
may not be able to survive destabilizing effects of politically charged trials); CENTRO DE
ESTUDIos LEGALES Y SOCIALES, ["CELS"] INFORME ANNUAL 1990, CAPITULO MEMORIA
(1990) [hereinafter CELS 1990] (explaining that Amnesty decrees interrupted trials
against: (1) 39 military personnel for illegal depravations of liberty, grave injuries, tor-
ments, and homicides; (2) 64 former guerilla members or political militants; (3) three
former Chief Commanders of Armed Forces who were accused of negligence in con-
duction of Malvinas War in 1982, and of causing deaths of hundreds of soldiers; (4) 164
military personnel called carapintadas of Prefecture Albatros group; as well as against
officials and civil agents of Air Force that participated in rebellions against democratic
government).
43. See Brown, supra note 41, at 211-12 (explaining that chief of army threatened
serious military action if federal court continued with its summons of five generals); see
also Shirley Christian, Argentine Departs, Democracy Hardly Bankrupt, N.Y. TIMES, July 8,
1989, § I (explaining that military prosecutions produced tension within armed forces
and ultimately led to three rebellions); Joseph B. Treaster, Revolt by 400 Argentine Troops
Quelled, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 1988, at § 1 (describing how rebellious soldiers revolted and
attempted to seize prison where senior officers convicted of human-rights abuses were
held); Orentlicher, supra note 24, at 2544 n.27 (explaining that Argentine military was
prepared to accept prosecution of its leaders, but some factions rebelled when scope of
prosecutions broadened); Argentine Defends Release of "Dirty War" Leaders, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 31, 1990, § 1, available at 1990 WLNR 2987170 (recounting Menem's defense of
his controversial pardons and protests of human rights community and families of dis-
appeared that ensued).
44. See, e.g., Rohter, supra note 1, at A3 (stating that reparations were distributed in
form of bonds); Valente, Belated Reparations, supra note 1 (describing passage of repara-
tions laws compensating families of disappeared).
2005] ARGENTINA'S REPARATION BONDS
3. Reparation
As part of Argentina's reconciliation process, the Argentine
government passed several reparations laws.4 5 In 1986, Alfonsfn
passed the first reparation law that provided economic compen-
sation for the families of the disappeared.46 President Menem
continued the effort by enacting more reparation laws.47 One of
these laws extended the classification of reparations recipients to
spouses of common law marriages of at least two years at the
time of disappearance.4" Other laws created judicial classifica-
tions for the disappeared, facilitating the inheritance of property
and the remarriage of widows and widowers,4 9 prohibited the
statute of limitations from barring reparations claims,5 ° and cre-
45. See Rohter, supra note 1, at A3 (stating that reparations bonds worth up to
U.S.$256,000 were issued as restitution for each death); see also Valente, Belated Repara-
tions, supra note 1 (explaining that reparations law provides for compensation in form
of bonds to families of disappeared persons). See, e.g., Pension a Familiares de
Desaparecidos [Pension for the Families of the Disappeared], Law No. 23.466, Feb. 16,
1987, B.O. (creating compensation packages for families of disappeared); Law No. 70/
91, supra note 11 (establishing reparations for those whose cases had been previously
held barred by statute of limitations); Law No. 24.043, supra note 11 (expanding criteria
for proof of torture and disappearance recognizing that traditional requirements of
evidence were in context of Dirty War crimes too strict); Law No. 24.321, supra note 11
(providing legal recognition of special status of disappeared in Argentina).
46. See Law No. 23.466, supra note 45 (creating compensation packages for families
of disappeared); see also Centro De Estudios Legales y Sociales, Primer Informe de La
Investigaci6n sobre Reparaciones, [First Report on Reparations Research] [hereinafter
CELS Draft] (draft on file with author), at 1 (2002) (describing how first government
following military dictatorship created compensation package for families of victims of
forced disappearance).
47. See Law No. 70/91, supra note 11 (establishing that statute of limitations did
not bar families of Dirty War victims' claims); see also Law No. 24.043, supra note 11, arts.
1-2 (creating wide criteria of proof for establishing forced disappearance and torture);
Law No. 24.321, supra note 11 (providing legal recognition of special status of disap-
peared in Argentina); Law No. 24.411, supra note 11, art. 4 (extending reparation bene-
fits to common law marriages in existence at least two years prior to disappearance or
death); CELS Draft, supra note 46, at 1-7 (discussing passage of various reparation laws).
48. See Law No. 24.411, supra note 11 (extending scope of reparation benefits); see
also CELS Draft, supra note 46, at 5 (describing how Law No. 24.411 defined forced
disappearance as deprivation of liberty followed by disappearance or stationing at clan-
destine detention center and also included those who were killed by armed forces, se-
curity forces or paramilitary groups prior to December 10, 1983).
49. See Law No. 24.321, supra note 11 (asserting judicial classifications for disap-
peared facilitating inheritance of property and remarriage of widows and widowers); see
also CELS Draft, supra note 46, at 5 (describing how Law No. 24.321 defined absence
due to forced disappearance as including those who prior to December 10, 1983, had
disappeared involuntarily from their domicile or residence leaving no news of their
whereabouts).
50. See Law No. 70/91, supra note 11 (expanding scope of cases reparation laws);
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ated broad criteria acceptable as proof of torture and disappear-
ance. 5 1 Yet, the compensation these families received soon lost
its value. 2
4. Economic and Sovereign Debt Crises
Argentina's economic crisis and resulting sovereign debt de-
fault arrived in late 2001.58 In response to the crisis, the govern-
ment abandoned its currency peg with the U.S. dollar and
floated the Argentine peso.54 The government also defaulted on
most of its U.S.$141 billion in public debt and imposed restric-
tions on bank deposits and withdrawals.55 The reparation bond
default was just a part of the larger nationwide crisis that pushed
millions of Argentines into poverty.5 6 The complexity of the Ar-
see also CELS Draft, supra note 46, at 1-2 (explaining that Law 70/91 was passed in part
to save reparations suits from being barred by statute of limitations).
51. See Law No. 24.043, supra note 11 (changing evidentiary requirements under
reparation laws); see also CELS, supra note 46, at 2-3 (describing documentation neces-
sary to prove detention under Law No. 24.043).
52. See, e.g., Rohter, supra note 1, at A3 (discussing impact of economic crisis on
reparations bonds); see also Valente, Belated Reparations, supra note 1 (describing devalu-
ation of reparations bonds in context of economic crisis).
53. See Todd Benson, Report Looks Harshly at LM.F. 's Role in Argentine Debt Crisis, N.Y.
TIMES, July 30, 2004, at W4, available at 2004 WLNR 5431797 (citing report issued by
Independent Evaluation Office of IMF criticizing IMF's policy of encouraging Argen-
tina's currency peg and its effect on economic crisis); see also IMF, IEO, supra note 12, at
6 (describing how Argentina defaulted on its sovereign debt); Argentina Creditors Unite to
Speed up Bond Talks, supra note 12 (stating that Argentina's default amounted to at least
U.S.$25 billion in unpaid bonds); Munter, supra note 18 (asserting that Argentina
stopped repayments on U.S.$9 billion making it world's biggest default to date).
54. See Benson, supra note 53 (describing how currency peg combined with IMF's
increased lending to Argentina led to ballooning debt and eventual economic and sov-
ereign debt crisis); see also Faille, supra note 13 (stating that Argentina defaulted on its
bonds giving rise to litigation); IMF, IEO, supra note 12, at 6 (stating that Argentina
abandoned its convertibility regime and floated the Argentine peso in early January
2002); Valente, Reparations for Banks, supra note 15 (stating that Argentina lifted parity
regime that had pegged Argentine peso to U.S. dollar for decade).
55. See Benson, supra note 53 (stating that IMF contributed to crisis by failing to
recognize Argentina's debt was unsustainable); see also Faille, supra note 13 (describing
Argentina's default); IMF, IEO, supra note 12, at 159 (stating that Argentine govern-
ment introduced partial deposit freeze and capital controls on December 1, 2001); Va-
lente, Reparations for Banks, supra note 15 (stating that economy minister moved to halt
run on banks by ordering restrictions on cash withdrawals).
56. See Benson, supra note 53 (declaring that Argentina's crisis has been compared
to Great Depression in United States); see also IMF, IEO, supra note 12, at 13 (describing
how crisis caused economy to contract by 11%, and cumulative output since 1998 to
decline by nearly 20%); Valente, Reparations for Banks, supra note 15 (describing how
54% of Argentine population, 20 million people, live in poverty).
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gentine sovereign debt negotiations stems from the fact that
most of those now holding the debt are individual bondholders,
not bank lenders. 7 Previously, the unified interests of the bank
lenders made litigation of sovereign debt disputes feasible and
practical. 58 Now, the creditors' diversity of interests makes reso-
lution via litigation very difficult.59 True to this analysis, the Ar-
gentine sovereign debt bondholders, among who are nationals
of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, and the United States, have
responded to the crises in diverse ways.60 Some bondholders
recommended suing while the Argentine government developed
its proposal for its sovereign debt settlement; others cautioned
against it.6 Last September, at the annual meeting of the Inter-
57. See Silverman & Deveno, supra note 19, at 179-81 (describing change in compo-
sition of creditors makes both voluntary restructuring and litigation more complex due
to diversity of interests represented by bondholders); see also Week's Top Story - Govern-
ment Gets 75% Reduction In Its Debt Capital supra note 19 (stating that Argentina's De-
cember 2001 default created most complex restructuring in history due to numerous
and diverse nature of bondholders).
58. See Silverman & Deveno, supra note 19, at 179-81 (describing how bank lenders
who held sovereign debt via syndicated bank loans could resolve sovereign debt dis-
putes through multi-party litigation); see also Temple, sup-a note 20 (stating that only
tiny minority of holders of Argentine bonds have resorted to litigation); Munter, supra
note 18 (stating that fewer than 1% of defaulted Argentine bonds are objects of litiga-
tion according to Trade Association for Emerging Markets ("EMTA")).
59. See Silverman & Deveno, supra note 19 (asserting that due to shift in nature of
creditors, litigation is less attractive as means of addressing defaulting sovereign
debtor); see also Munter, supra note 18 (stating that for many bondholders litigation is
impractical and their only options are either joining with others to influence debt re-
structuring or selling bonds at current market price).
60. See Barber et al., supra note 18 (describing how majority of 40,000 Japanese
investors who bought Argentine bonds are elderly individuals or small associations who
invested large portion of their assets); see also Mon, supra note 19 (stating some holders
of Argentine bonds recommend suing in court, while others favor mediation); Munter,
supra note 18 (stating that for many bondholders only options are either joining with
others to influence debt restructuring or selling bonds at current market price); Va-
lente, Small Creditors, supra note 18 (describing how association of Argentine bondhold-
ers is contesting Argentina's decision to prioritize paying debts to multilateral credit
institutions instead of paying more vulnerable local individuals).
61. See Barber et al., supra note 18 (describing how Italian bond holders, number-
ing 450,000, are demanding that banks who sold bonds be obligated to investors nurs-
ing losses, and Japanese investors, numbering 40,000, are mostly elderly individuals or
small groups who invested large portion of their assets, and are afraid they will be side-
lined in negotiations by heavyweight U.S. institutional investors); see also Mon, supra
note 19 (describing how bondholders differ in nationality, economic circumstance, and
reaction to default); Munter, supra note 18 (describing how Argentina's default is most
complex in history concerning 99 different bonds denominated in 8 currencies and
hundreds of thousands of private individuals from Germany, Italy, Japan, and United
States); Valente, Small Creditors, supra note 18 (describing how local creditors in Argen-
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national Monetary Fund held in Dubai, Argentina shocked inves-
tors by proposing a 75% reduction of its debt capital by restruc-
turing the country's defaulted bonds worth U.S.$95 billion.62
This proposal, if accepted, would leave bondholders, including
reparation recipients like Oesterheld and Garcia-Albores, with
far less than any other previous sovereign debt negotiation.63 Of
all the bondholders, Garcia-Albores, Oesterheld and the other
reparation recipients are the only ones who never voluntarily in-
vested in the Argentine Government. 64 As involuntary investors,
the reparation recipients possess different sources of remedy
from other bondholders.6
5
The changing face of sovereign debt has inspired many in-
stitutions to create proposals for change.66 For example, the Ju-
tina hold 39% of total Argentina's public debt and want differentiation in negotiations
for small savers like themselves).
62. See Mon, supra note 19 (describing how plan proposed by Argentina would
contain combination of debt forgiveness, reductions in interest rates, and extensions of
amortization); see also Temple, supra note 20 (describing how Argentina's proposal
which covered some 152 bonds denominated in 14 separate currencies and issued in 8
different jurisdictions suggested: a reduction in principal of debt of 75%); Argentina
Creditors Unite to Speed up Bond Talks, supra note 12 (describing how Argentina stated it
would not pay bond holders any more than U.S. 25 cents for every U.S. dollar of de-
faulted debt and that bondholders unanimously rejected this proposal).
63. See Mon, supra note 19 (stating that various bondholders responded differently
to idea of debt forgiveness with some rejected idea categorically while others consid-
ered it on individual basis); see also Temple, supra note 20 (describing how bondholders
responded negatively to proposal which, if accepted, would constitute lowest debt write-
down ever received by defaulting country in history, and was even more insulting be-
cause it included repayment of 100% of principal to multilateral institutions); Argentina
Faces Restructuring Challenge, supra note 15 (asserting that Argentine default is more
complex that Russian financial crisis of 1998 because Argentine collapse encompassed
domestic bonds and international debt).
64. See NAT'L OMBUDSMAN, DEFENSOR, supra note 17, at 38-40 (urging Minister of
Economy to lift suspension of payments on reparation bonds because suspending them
constituted violation of American Convention; arguing that although ' legal conse-
quences resulting from severe economic crisis are evident they cannot constitute regres-
sion in basic human rights to life, liberty, access to justice, equality before law, which
were the plan and motivation behind reparation laws); see also Plumb & Helft, supra
note 8 (arguing that recipients of reparations bonds have distinct history from other
bondholders); Rohter, supra note 1 (quoting lawyer representing families of disap-
peared explaining that reparations recipients are not normal investors but victims of
crimes).
65. See Plumb & Helft, supra note 8 (asserting history of reparation recipients is
from other bondholders); see also Rohter, supra note 1, at A3 (explaining that repara-
tions recipients are victims of crimes not usual creditors); NAT'L OMBUDSMAN, DEFEN-
SOR, supra note 17, at 38-40 (describing how reparation recipients were in a different
category than normal investors).
66. See Ann Pettifor, supra note 26 (stating that some proposals suggest ad hoc dis-
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bilee Framework for International Insolvency proposed basing
international insolvency on Chapter 9 of United States Bank-
ruptcy Code principles, creating an ad hoc body appointed to
deal with individual petitions for insolvency.67 The Council on
Foreign Relations, a non-partisan, national membership organi-
zation, issued broad recommendations suggesting a voluntary
proceeding modeled on Chapter 9 principles as well.6" The IMF
has suggested the creation of a Sovereign Debt Restructuring
Mechanism ("SDRM"), and is in the process of finalizing a statu-
tory framework for addressing sovereign debt restructurings. 9
At the IMF's Sovereign Debt Restructuring Conference on Janu-
ary 22, 2003, the IMF circulated a paper for comment and criti-
cism covering the mechanics of a SDRM.7 0 Under the paper's
proposals, the debtor sovereign could determine whether to ex-
clude certain claims but certain claims would automatically be
ineligible for restructuring such as claims held by international
organizations."1 Additionally, creditors would approve the pro-
pute resolution committees); see also, Jonathan Sedlak, Sovereign Debt Restructuring: Stat-
utory Reform or Contractual Solution?, 152 U. PA. L. REv. 1483 (exploring IMF proposal
and U.S. Treasury Department proposal); Hal S. Scott, A Bankruptcy Procedure for Sover-
eign Debtors ?, 37 INT'L LAw. 103, 118 (analyzing various suggested reforms for sovereign
debt restructuring).
67. See Ann Pettifor, supra note 26 (describing proposal based on Chapter 9 involv-
ing ad hoc dispute resolution committees). But cf Sedlak, supra note 66, at 1491-503
(stating that IMF's proposal was designed to create functional equivalent of interna-
tional bankruptcy court); Scott, supra note 66, at 118 (describing two approaches to
resolution of sovereign debt question, one favoring contractual mechanisms and use of
collective action clauses and other proposing creation of statutory sovereign bankruptcy
procedure).
68. See Samuels, supra note 26 (describing proposals discussed at roundtable con-
cerning sovereign debt). But cf. Sedlak, supra note 66, at 1491-1503 (describing conflict
of proposals by U.S. Treasury Department and those advocated by some members of
IMF); Scott, supra note 66, at 118 (describing differences between proposals of contrac-
tual mechanisms versus suggested statutory bankruptcy procedure).
69. See Silverman & Deveno, supra note 19, at 192-94 (describing how at annual
meeting of World Bank and IMF in September of 2002, IMFC requested that IMF de-
velop framework for sovereign debt); see also Sandra M. Rocks & Kate A. Sawyer, Survey
of International Commercial Law Developments During 2003, 59 Bus. LAw. 1663, 1673-74
(2004) (exploring suggested creation of body to assist debtor Nations in managing
their debt); Sedlak, supra note 66, at 1491-97 (exploring IMF proposal that market par-
ticipants adopt statutory scheme to address debt restructuring); Scott, supra note 66, at
122-25 (comparing suggested IMF proposal to Chapter 11 model).
70. See Kohler, supra note 26 (describing function of Sovereign Debt Restructuring
Mechanism ("SDRM")); see also Rocks & Sawyer, supra note 69, at 1673-74 (stating that
at April 2003 IMF meeting they circulated and discussed working paper proposing crea-
tion of SDRM).
71. See generally Kohler, supra note 26 (describing provisions of proposal); see also
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posal offered by the sovereign only a super majority vote of 75%
per class at which point the proposal would be binding on all
creditors who were on notice regarding the proceeding. 72 Fi-
nally, an IMF body would address certain restructuring dis-
putes.73 The IMF is also considering another proposal involving
collective action clauses, which would allow a supermajority of
bondholders to bind individual bondholders and require mini-
mum of total number of bondholders to participate collectively
before the proceeding would be valid. 4
B. Legal Analysis
The Argentine government issued the reparation bonds in
response to the crimes committed against the disappeared and
their families, in accordance with domestic and international
law.75 The government subsequently suspended payments on
these bonds due to an economic crisis.76 Therefore, acknowl-
edging, as the Argentine government has, the domestic and in-
ternational right to receive reparations, 77 the reparation recipi-
Rocks & Sawyer, supra note 69, at 1673-74 (stating that SDRM proposed naming organi-
zations whose claims would be initially excluded from SDRM); Scott, supra note 66, at
123 (asserting that certain creditors, like IMF and World Bank would not be subject to
SDRM).
72. See generally Kohler, supra note 26 (stating provisions regarding voting). See
Scott, supra note 66, at 123 (describing how restructuring plan would be approved by
super-majority of creditors); see also Sedlak, supra note 66, at 1493 (quoting Krueger of
IMF stating that an important component of restructuring proposal would be ability of
qualified majority of creditors to bind minority creditors).
73. See generally Kohler, supra note 26 (describing suggested creation of SDDRF);
see also Rocks & Sawyer, supra note 69, at 1674 (discussing creating of SDDRF as admin-
istrative agency with authority to promulgate rules and adjudicate disputes); Scott, supra
note 66, at 123 (stating that IMF proposal included creation of independent tribunal
dedicated to adjudicating lack of equitable treatment or valuation of claims).
74. See Kohler, supra note 26 (describing alternative proposals under considera-
tion); see also Scott, supra note 66, at 123 (stating that exact percentage of majority
needed to bind minority creditors was not yet determined); Sedlak, supra note 66, at
1493 (citing that important element of SDRM would be ability of majority of creditors
to bind minority).
75. See NAT'L OMBUDSMAN, DEFENSOR, supra note 17, at 38-40 (describing how repa-
ration bonds were issued in accordance with Argentina's international and domestic
obligations following crimes of Dirty War); see also Plumb & Helft, supra note 8 (describ-
ing that reparations were paid as result of Dirty War events).
76. See Plumb & Helft, supra note 8 (explaining impact of economic crisis on repa-
ration bonds); see also Rohter, supra note 1, at A3 (explaining that Argentine govern-
ment suspended payments of interest and principal on these bonds as well as other
foreign and domestic debts).
77. See CONST. ARG. Pt. II, ch. IV, § 75, art. 22 (1994) (incorporating nine human
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ents will confront the way that the economic and sovereign debt
crises have affected their rights.78 They could consider legal
remedies in Argentine courts,7" before international tribunals, °
and via extraterritorial avenues, such as ATCA.81 This Note will
now explore the legal remedies available to the reparation recip-
ients.
rights treaties into Constitution itself); see also ICCPR, supra note 24, art. 9(5) (provid-
ing compensation to victims of unlawful arrest and detention); ICCPR, supra note 24,
art. 7 (forbidding torture and other cruel or inhuman treatment); Convention Against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10,
1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 112, pt. I, art. 14 (requiring States to ensure that victims of torture
have redress and rights to fair compensation); American Convention on Human Rights,
art. 1(1), Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 (identifying that States are obligated to
respect rights enshrined in Convention), art. 4 (1) (establishing the right to life, forbid-
ding arbitrary depravation of life), art. 5(2) (forbidding cruel and inhuman or degread-
ing treatment or punishment), art. 7 (providing for right to personal liberty). See gener-
ally BARRY E. CARTER & PHILIP R. TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAw 111-12 (3d ed. 1999)
(describing how multilateral treaties in force, such as ICCPR, create legally binding
obligations for signatory Nations). But see Janet Koven Levit, The Constitutionalization of
Human Rights in Argentina: Problem or Promise?, 37 COLUM J. TRANSNAT'L L. 281, 313-44
(1999) (stating that Argentine Constitution's disregard for international law makes Ar-
gentine Treaty obligations irrelevant; that court decisions showjudiciary to be passive in
recognizing new constitutional status of treaties incorporated under Section 75/22 act-
ing with limited freedom in broadening scope of international human rights law within
Argentine system; and arguing that since rule of law is not firmly anchored in Argentina
such incorporation of these international human rights treaties based soley on law,
rather then one that engages "myriad of transnational actors" is not likely to succeed).
78. See CONST. ARG. pt. I, ch. I, § 28 (1994) (providing that principles, guarantees
and rights of Constitution should not be modified by laws regulating their enforce-
ment); see also Nat'l Ombudsman, Press Release of National Defender, Banking Restric-
tions and Pesification Rendered Unconstitutional (July 8, 2002) (on file with author)
[hereinafter Nat'l Ombudsman, Banking Restrictions] (referring to act that established
country's state of national economic emergency); IMF, IEO, supra note 12, at 46 (stat-
ing that on March 29, 2001, Domingo Cavallo, Argentine Minister of Economy, secured
"emergency powers" from Congress).
79. See, e.g., CONST. ARG. pt. I, ch. I, § 17 (1994) (declaring that the right to prop-
erty may not be violated, and no one can be deprived of it except by virtue of sentence
based on law); SANTOS P. A.MADEO, ARGENTINE CONSTITUTIONAL LAw, 33-34, 195-97, 205
(1943) (exploring case law upholding constitutional property rights in Argentina).
80. See, e.g., In re Veldsquez Rodriguez, [1998] Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 4,
174 (holding that victims torture and disappearance should be fairly compensated in a
suit before Inter-American Court); 362 (1994); see also Shelton, supra note 24, at 362
(discussing Veldsquez Rodriguez decision and its contribution to Inter-American Court's
jurisprudence).
81. See Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1993) (establishing original juris-
diction in district court for non-U.S. citizens suing on torts in violation of law of Na-
tions). See, e.g., Filartiga v. Pefia-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 878 (2d Cir. 1980) (resolving case
brought by citizens of Paraguay against person allegedly responsible for torture and
disappearance of their son).
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1. Argentine Constitutional law Protecting Property Rights
Domestic Argentine law protects the reparation recipients'
property rights.8 2 Argentina's constitutional reform of 1994 in-
corporated nine international human rights treaties into its Con-
stitution, many of which provide for the right to compensation
when protected rights are violated.8" Additionally, the Argen-
tine Constitution, in Article 17, provides for the protection of
property rights such as those held by the reparation bond recipi-
ents.8 4 Not only does Article 17 forbid the violation of property
rights, it also requires authorization for expropriation for the
public interest and compensation for the victims before the
fact.8 5 Furthermore, since the reparation bonds were devalued
following economic emergency legislation, it is important to
consider Article 28, which states that other national laws should
not modify the principles of the Constitution. 6
82. See CONST. ARG. pt. I, ch. I, § 17 (1994) (protecting property rights); see also
AMADEO, supra note 79 (exploring case law upholding constitutional property rights in
Argentina).
83. See CONST. ARc. pt. II, ch. IV, § 75, art. 22 (1994) (incorporating American
Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man; the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights; American Convention on Human Rights; International Pact on Economic, So-
cial and Cultural Rights; International Pact on Civil and Political Rights and its empow-
ering Protocol; Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide; Interna-
tional Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination; Conven-
tion on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women; Convention
against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatments or Punishments;
and Convention on the Rights of the Child into Constitution itself). See, e.g., ICCPR,
supra note 24, art. 9(5) (affording victims of unlawful arrest and detention right to fair
compensation). See generally, Orentlicher, supra note 24 (describing how Inter-American
Court has read requirement that victims of human rights abuses receive adequate com-
pensation into Inter-American Convention on Human Rights Article 1(1)); Levit, supra
note 77, at 310-11 (describing how constitutional reforms of 1994 granted constitu-
tional standing to nine international human rights treaties by incorporating them into
Constitution itself).
84. See CONST. ARG. pt. I, ch. I, § 17 (1994) (describing requirements for expropri-
ating for public interest); see also AMADEO, supra note 79 (exploring cases related to
expropriation in Argentina).
85. See CoNsT. ARG. pt. I, ch. I, § 17 (1994) (allowing expropriation only for public
interest and with compensation for victims before fact); see also AMADEO, supra note 79
(citing case law interpreting government's power to expropriate for public interest).
86. See CONST. ARG. pt. 1, ch. I, § 28 (1994) (establishing that principles, guaran-
tees and rights recognized in Constitution should not be modified by laws that regulate
their enforcement); see also Nat'l Ombudsman, Banking Restrictions, supra note 78
(stating that Section 28 of Constitution limits extent to which government can infringe
on rights during emergency).
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2. Extraterritorial Remedy via the Alien Tort Claims Act
("ATCA") and its Jurisdictional Hurdles
Under ATCA, can sue for torts in violation of the law of Na-
tions in U.S. district courts.8 7 In order to succeed in a claim
under ATCA, the reparation bondholders must prove a violation
of the law of Nations and overcome the defenses of sovereign
immunity and Act of State Doctrine."8 The reparation recipients
could pursue this avenue as a remedy, as have other victims of
87. See Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1993) (establishing original juris-
diction in district court for non-citizens suing on torts in violation of law of Nations). See
CARTER & TRIMBLE, supra note 77, at 270 (describing difference in opinion of Judge
Bork who argued Alien Torts Claims Act ("ATCA") only provided basis for subject mat-
ter jurisdiction not causes of action for individuals because at time it was enacted only
States had causes of action under international law and Judge Edwards who argued it
also provides statutory basis for cause of action); see also Terry Collingsworth, The Key
Human Rights Challenge: Developing Enforcement Mechanisms, 15 HARV. HUM. RTs. J. 183,
202 (2002) (identifying that ATCA is useful but limited tool for enforcing human rights
norms due to fact that federal jurisdiction over defendant must be obtained, scope of
law of Nations is narrow, evidence of abuses is difficult to obtain and produce, and cost
of litigating in United States is high); Ellen Lutz & Kathryn Sikkink, International Human
Rights Law in Practice: The Justice Cascade: The Evolution and Impact of Foreign Human
Rights Treaties in Latin America, 2 CHI. J. INT'L L. 1, 8-9 (2001) (describing how lawyers
from Center for Constitutional Rights ("CCR") first used ATCA in 1979 to test whether
its jurisdictional basis could be used to sue in U.S. court for human rights violations that
occurred abroad and that success of Filartiga provided U.S. human rights lawyers with
new avenues for enforcement of human rights norms); HENRYJ. STEINER & PHILIP AL-
STON, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT, LAw, POLITICS & MORALS 739, 1056
(3d ed. 2000) (describing how ATCA cases, including Filartiga, take different positions
on statute's purpose, effect and basis forjurisdiction: (1) ATCA only purports to create
subject matter jurisdiction; (2) ATCA creates federal cause of action; (3) ATCA creates
general federal question "arising under" jurisdiction because rests on federal statute.);
Beth Stephens, Conceptualizing Violence: Present and Future Developments in International
Law: Panel I: Human Rights & Civil Wrongs at Home and Abroad: Old Problems and New
Paradigms: Conceptualizing Violence Under International Law: Do Tort Remedies Fit the
Crime?, 60 ALB. L. REv. 579, 594-95 (2002) (describing that U.S. Congress affirmed Filar-
tiga holding regarding ATCA by passing the Torture Victims Protection Act creating a
federal cause of action broadening jurisdiction of ATCA by including claims by U.S.
citizens as well as non-citizens). Cf Torture Victims Protection Act (1992) (codified at
28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1994)) (providing that individuals who acting under color of law
subject others to torture and or extrajudicial killing shall be liable in civil actions for
damages).
88. See Republic of Argentina & Banco Central de La Republica Argentina v.
Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 609-19 (1992) (illustrating that plaintiffs, in order to pre-
vail against Argentina, would have to show case fell into an exception of Foreign Sover-
eign Immunities Act ("FSIA"), such as the commercial activity exception requiring that
activity have direct effect in United States); see also Frederic L. Kirgis, Jr., Understanding
the Act of State Doctrine's Effect, 82 Am. J. INT'L L. 58 (1988) (describing Act of State
Doctrine as that which prohibits countries to review decisions of other States regarding
matters within their own borders).
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torture and disappearance.8 9
II. ARGENTINE AND INTERNATIONAL CASE LAW
INTERPRETING RIGHT TO REPARATIONS
In analyzing the reparation recipients' legal options, this
Note will explore how courts have interpreted their rights under
domestic, extrajudicial, and international law.9" The reparation
recipients have the right to protected property under the Consti-
tution.9 They also have rights under international treaties and
under extraterritorial statutes like ATCA.92 In the pursuit of the
vindication of these rights they must consider the relevant do-
mestic and international case law interpreting these diverse
laws.93 Thus, it is important to consider how courts have inter-
preted these rights.9 4
A. Argentine Cases Exploring Right to Receive Reparations and how
Economic Emergency Impacts that Right
As aforementioned, Argentina, in attempting to prosecute
and punish those responsible for the Dirty War crimes, met lim-
89. See, e.g., Filartiga v. Pefia-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 878 (2d Cir. 1980) (finding for
plaintiffs who were citizens of Paraguay suing person allegedly responsible for torture
and disappearance of their son under ATCA); see also Stephens, supra note 87, at 594-96
(describing how Filartiga impacted subsequent legislation).
90. See, e.g., MILLER ET AL., supra note 23, at 1223-33 (exploring caselaw on Argen-
tine constitutional property rights); Nat'l Ombudsman, Banking Restrictions, supra
note 78 (describing how Argentine Supreme Court ruled on constitutionality of emer-
gency measure passed during economic crisis)
91. See, e.g., CONST. ARG. pt. I, ch. I, § 17 (1994) (protecting property rights); see
also AMADEO, supra note 79 (exploring case law upholding constitutional property rights
in Argentina).
92. See, e.g., Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1993) (establishing original
jurisdiction in U.S. district courts for non-U.S. citizens suing on torts in violation of law
of Nations); Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 878 (finding against person allegedly responsible for
torture and disappearance of their son under ATCA); ICCPR, supra note 24, art. 9(5)
(affording victims of unlawful arrest and detention right to fair compensation); Ste-
phens, supra note 87, at 594-95 (describing evolution of ATCA jurisprudence).
93. See, e.g., AMADEO, supra note 79, at 205 (showing that case of "Sociedades
Andnimas Compafiia de Petr6leo La Repablica y otras," CSJN [1932] 164 Fallos 140, upheld
principle that only judgment by competent authority will deprive person of property
right); see also, MILLER ET AL., supra note 23, at 1223-33 (exploring caselaw on Argentine
constitutional property rights).
94. See, e.g., NAT'L OMBUDSMAN, DEIENSOR, supra note 17 (describing how Argen-
tine Supreme Court ruled on constitutionality of emergency measure passed during
economic crisis); Nat'l Ombudsman, Banking Restrictions, supra note 78 (illustrating
that National Defender challenged legislation passed during economic emergency).
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ited success given the relative instability of its democracy. 95 Ar-
gentine reparation laws have recently met a similar fate due to
the present economic crisis.96 Thus, there is a question as to
whether the present economic crisis dispelled the obligation to
make reparations.9"
1. Argentine Constitution Jurisprudence and Property Rights
of Reparation Recipients
Argentine constitutional jurisprudence upholds the prop-
erty rights of the reparation recipients.9" The right to receive
reparations is established by the treaties incorporated in Section
75/22."9 However, the Argentine Court has been conservative in
95. See Coonan, supra note 34, at 522-23 (describing that Alfonsin responded to
pressures by passing La Ley de Punto Final [Full Stop Law] creating 60-day limiting pe-
riod after which no new charges related to State-sponsored crimes could be brought
and La Ley de Obedencia Debida [Due Obedience Law] creating irrebutable presumption
of innocence for soldiers following orders); see also Brown, supra note 41, at 212 (ex-
plaining that chief of army threatened serious military action if federal court continued
with its summons of five generals and that President Alfonsin wanted limited trials of
military personnel); Orentlicher, supra note 24, at 2545 n.27 (explaining that Argentine
military was prepared to accept prosecution of its leaders, but some factions rebelled
when scope of prosecutions broadened); Argentine Departs, Democracy Hardly Bankrupt,
supra note 43 (describing military unrest resulting from prosecutions which ultimately
led to three rebellions); Revolt by 400 Argentine Troops Quelled, supra note 43 (describing
how rebellious soldiers revolted and attempted to seize prison where senior officers
convicted of human rights abuses were held); Argentina Defends Release of "Dirty War"
Leaders, supra note 43 (describing protests of human rights community in response to
Menem's pardons).
96. See Plumb & Helft, supra note 8 (explaining that in 2001 government was pres-
suring recipients to accept lower value on their bonds as part of their attempts to
lighten their U.S.$132 billion debt and that many were accepting offer due to likeli-
hood of governmental default on all their debt); see also Rohter, supra note 1, at A3
(explaining that Argentine government suspended payments of interest and principal
on these bonds as well as other foreign and domestic debts).
97. See, e.g., CONST. ARG. pt. I, ch. I, § 28 (1994) (establishing that Constitutional
rights should not be curtailed by laws regulating their enforcement); Nat'l
Ombudsman, Banking Restrictions, supra note 78 (exploring constitutionality of gov-
ernmental legislation affecting property rights in context of economic emergency).
98. See, e.g., AMADEO, supra note 79, at 203 (showing that case of "Sociedades
An6nimas Comparia de Petr6leo La Repiblica y otras," CSJN [1932] 164 Fallos 140, upheld
principle that only judgment by competent authority will deprive person of property
right); see also MILLER ET AL., supra note 23, at 1223-33 (exploring caselaw on Argentine
constitutional property rights).
99. See CoNsT. ARG. pt. II, ch. IV, § 75, art. 22 (1994) (incorporating nine human
rights treaties into Constitution itself); see also ICCPR supra note 24, art. 9(5) (providing
compensation to victims of unlawful arrest and detention); ICCPR supra note 24, art. 7,
(forbidding torture and other cruel or inhuman treatment); Convention Against Tor-
ture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10,
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its integration of these new rights into the Constitutional system,
only interpreting Section 75/22 to affirm new rights only to the
extent that they harmonize with more traditional constitutional
rights.100
The Argentine Supreme Court interpreted Article 17 of the
Constitution to guarantee that the government cannot confis-
cate property without a judgment based upon law. a"' The Court
outlined three significant effects of this conclusion.' °2 First, the
judgment must have a reasonable legal basis. t'0 Second, the gov-
ernment must notify the person affected of the judicial proceed-
ings and must give the person a hearing.1 0 4 Third, after one has
acquired a property right, the government cannot take it away
except by judgment of a competent authority.'0 5 The question
remains, what authority the government has to freeze bank ac-
counts during an economic emergency. 10 6
1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85, 23 I.L.M. 1027, pt. I, art. 14 (requiring States to ensure that
victims of torture have redress and rights to fair compensation); American Convention
on Human Rights, art. 1 (1), Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 (identifying obligation to
respect rights enshrined therein), art. 4 (1) (creating right to life), art. 5(2) (establish-
ing right to humane treatment), art. 7 (creating right to personal liberty).
100. See Levit, supra note 77, at 325 (stating that courts interpretation renders in-
ternational human rights law latent and arguing that since rule of law is not firmly
anchored in Argentina such incorporation of these international human rights treaties
based soley on law, is not likely to succeed).
101. See AMADEO, supra note 79, at 203 (illustrating that procedural concepts of
due process incorporated into Court's interpretation of Article 17 have three significant
effects); see also MILLER ET AL., supra note 23, at 1223-33 (exploring case law on Argen-
tine constitutional property rights).
102. See AMADEO, supra note 79, at 203-05 (describing relevant case law affirming
these three effects of due process interpretation of Article 17); see also MILLER ET AL.,
supra note 23, at 1226-27 (exploring caselaw interpreting Article 17 property rights).
103. See AMADEO, supra note 79, at 203-05 (citing "Rey," CSJN [1909] 112 Fallos
384, "Gobierno Naciona" CSJN [1897] 67 Fallos 185, and "Castro," CSJN [1920] 131 Fal-
los 387, as examples of requirement thatjudgment must have reasonable legal basis);
see also MILLER ET AL., supra note 23, at 1226-27 (analyzing jurisprudence upholding
property rights under Article 17).
104. See AMADEO, supra note 79, at 204-05 (citing "Necchi de Rodriguez," CSJN [ 1927]
149 Fallos 5, as example of Court rendering judgment invalid for failure to provide
defendant with notice and hearing); see also MILLER ET AL., supra note 23, at 1223-33
(illustrating cases upholding requirements of notice and hearing).
105. See AMADEO, supra note 79, at 205 (showing that case of "Sociedades An6nimas
Compalia de Petr6leo La Repriblica y otras," CSJN [1932] 164 Fallos 140, upheld principle
that only judgment by competent authority will deprive person of property right); see
also MILLER ET AL., supra note 23, at 1226-27 (discussing cases interpreting economic
rights under Argentine constitution).
106. See Doug Casey, What's Next for Argentina, WoRL NEW DAILY, Aug. 1, 2002
(analyzing Argentine President Duhalde's decision to undermine authority of Argen-
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2. The Argentine Supreme Court's Decision on the
Constitutionality of the Bank Freeze Legislation and the
Executive's Response
The interaction between the judicial and the executive
branches of government during the economic crisis illustrates
some concerns about the efficacy of an Argentine remedy for
the reparation recipients. 1"7 In the height of the unfolding eco-
nomic crisis in 2003, the Argentine government froze all savings
accounts over U.S.$3,000 in order to combat the run on cash
withdrawals.1 l 8 The National Ombudsman, an Argentine civil
liberties defense organization, brought a class action suit chal-
lenging the constitutionality of this measure. 1 9 The claim was
based on the assertion that the Bank Freeze Legislation consti-
tuted a confiscation of property because it devalued bank ac-
counts over 50%.11° The Argentine government, in its defense,
tine Supreme Court with allegations of corruption and improprieties); see also Argentina
Bank Runs Feared, CBSNEWS.coM, Feb. 1, 2002 (discussing judicial decision on constitu-
tionality of bank freeze legislation).
107. See Casey, supra note 106 (describing how tension between President and Su-
preme Court led to Duhalde undermining legitimacy of Court and issuing decree re-
stricting access to courts); see also Se Aceleran los Tiempos de la Corte para Resolver el Corralon
[They have Accelerated Time for Court to Resolve Bank Freeze], NoIcIAs
FINANC1ARAS/GRuPOS DE DLAIuos AMERICA, Aug. 1, 2002 (describing how Duhalde, in his
last week, passed a decree aimed at halting execution of judicial decisions related to
bank freeze); Nuevo decreto obliga a devolver los ahorros en marzo, NOTcIAS FINANCIARAS/
GRUPOS DE DIAuos AMERICA, July 25, 2002 (explaining that for 120 days execution of
sentences were barred by Presidential Decree 1316).
108. See Argentina Bank Runs Feared, supra note 106 (describing Argentine Supreme
Court's decision ruling that forbidding cash withdrawals was violation of property
rights); see also Casey, supra note 106 (citing unanimous ruling of Supreme Court that
Bank Freeze legislation was unconstitutional); IMF, IEO supra note 12, at 21 & 159
(stating that on December 1, 2001, Argentine government in response to intensified
capital flight and deposit runs, introduced partial deposit freeze and capital controls).
109. See Nat'l Ombudsman, Banking Restrictions, supra note 78 (stating that Na-
tional Defender was challenging Section 2(a) of Decree 1570/01 on the reprogram-
ming established by Resolution 6/02 of the Ministry of Economy, modified by Resolu-
tion 46/02 and its annex, and Section 2 of Decree 214/02 ("Bank Freezing Legisla-
tion")). But see Press Release of Nat'l Defender, National Ombudsman Denounced
Threats to the Federal Courts (Apr. 12, 2002) (on file with author) [hereinafter De-
nounced Threats] (explaining that National Defender had been receiving death threats
addressed to himself and his family related to his effort involving tariff legislation).
110. See Nat'l Ombudsman, Banking Restrictions, supra note 78 (explaining that
reduction proposed by legislation rendered peso value 1.4%, constituting a devaluation
of over 50%); see also Argentina Bank Runs Feared, supra note 106 (citing Argentine Su-
preme Court's decision ruling that prohibiting cash withdrawals was violation of prop-
erty rights).
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asserted that it properly exercised its emergency powers under
Section 28 of the National Constitution."'1 The Argentine Su-
preme Court, however, rejected this argument and found that
even in emergencies, the State, as an agent of the common wel-
fare, cannot violate the limit established by Section 28 of the
Constitution.1 2 Therefore, the Court held that the government
could not so grossly violate certain Constitutional rights, such as
the right to own private property, despite the state of economic
emergency.1 13 This precedent is favorable to the reparation re-
cipients because the government also violated their property
rights by devaluing the bonds during the economic emer-
gency.1 14
The Argentine government also asserted that under Act
25.561,115 declaring the economic emergency, the judiciary has
no right to review the State's decisions on how to confront the
crisis.116 The Court acknowledged that it had no authority to
111. See CONST. ARG. pt. I, ch. I, § 28 (1994) (establishing that Constitutional rights
shall not be modified by laws created to regulate their enforcement); see also Nat'l
Ombudsman, Banking Restrictions, supra note 78 (referring to act that established
country's state of national economic emergency).
112. See CONST. ARG. pt. I, ch. I, § 28 (1994) (declaring that principles, guarantees
and rights of Constitution should not be modified by enforcement laws); see also Nat'l
Ombudsman, Banking Restrictions, supra note 78 (citing that Section 28 of Constitu-
tion imposes limit to what extent State can infringe on rights during emergency).
113. See Argentina Bank Runs Feared, supra note 106 (describing Argentine Supreme
Court's decision ruling that forbidding cash withdrawals was violation of property
rights); see also Casey, supra note 106 (describing how Supreme Court ruled unani-
mously that Bank Freeze legislation was unconstitutional); Nat'l Ombudsman, Banking
Restrictions, supra note 77 (explaining that restriction on property rights had exceeded
acceptable limit).
114. See Rohter, supra note 1, at A3 (describing Argentine government's suspen-
sion of payments of interest and principal on reparation bonds); see also Plumb & Helft,
supra note 8 (explaining that government pressured recipients to accept lower value on
their bonds); IMF, 1EO, supra note 12, at 6 (discussing Argentine government's com-
plete default on its sovereign debt).
115. See IMF, IEO, supra note 12 (stating that on March 29, 2001, Domingo
Cavallo, Minister of Economy, secured "emergency powers" from Congress); see also
Plumb & Helft, supra note 8 (explaining that in 2001, government was pressuring recip-
ients to accept lower value on their bonds as part of their attempts to lighten their
U.S.$132 billion debt and many were accepting due to likelihood of governmental de-
fault on all their debt); Rohter, supra note 1, at A3 (explaining that Argentine govern-
ment suspended payments of interest and principal on these bonds as well as other
foreign and domestic debts).
116. See IMF, IEO, supra note 12, at 158 (describing how Argentine Government
argued that restriction was valid exercise of emergency powers, and as such was not
subject to judicial review); see also Denounced Threats, supra note 109 (describing sub-
sequent Presidential Decree denying access to courts).
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judge the correctness of the State's response to the emergency,
however, they could judge whether the response went too far.'1 7
Noting that the forced conversion to the peso had established a
50% reduction in the value of the savings accounts, the Court
found the government responsible for confiscating property.'
Thus, the Argentine Supreme Court declared the extent of the
infringement of rights invalid and unconstitutional even within
the emergency framework of Act 25.561."' This holding is
favorable to the reparation recipients because the government's
response to the economic crisis also devalued their bonds by a
high amount.
1 20
The executive's response to these decisions creates a troub-
ling precedent for the reparation recipients. 121  The National
Ombudsman initiated a suit on behalf of all people with savings
accounts, and the application of the Court's holding threatened
to be widespread. 122 Thus, Duhalde issued Presidential Decree
No. 1316/02 ("the Decree") that suspended, for the term of 120
days, the execution of all legal decisions on banking restric-
117. See IMF, IEO, supra note 12, 158 (showing that Court distinguished between
review of correctness of general response from review of extent of element of re-
sponse); see also Denounced Threats, supra note 109 (describing executive branch's re-
sponse to Court's holding).
118. See IMF, IEO, supra note 12, 158 (describing that Court held pesification at
1.4% constituted taking); see also Nat'l Ombudsman, Banking Restrictions, supra note
78 (referring to act that established country's state of national economic emergency).
119. See IMF, IEO, supra note 12, 158 (holding that despite emergency Court had
right to conclude that government had gone too far); see also Nat'l Ombudsman, Bank-
ing Restrictions, supra note 78 (referring to act that established country's state of na-
tional economic emergency).
120. See IMF, IEO, supra note 12 (describing how in December of 2001, govern-
ment defaulted on its sovereign debt); see also Plumb & Helft, supra note 8 (explaining
that in 2001, government was pressuring recipients to accept lower value on their bonds
as part of their attempts to lighten their U.S.$132 billion debt and many were accepting
due to likelihood of governmental default on all their debt); Rohter, supra note 1, at A3
(explaining that Argentine government suspended payments of interest and principal
on these bonds as well as other foreign and domestic debts).
121. See Denounced Threats, supra note 109 (describing Presidential Decree deny-
ing access to courts); see also Nuevo decreto obliga a devolver los ahorros en matzo, supra note
107 (explaining that for 120 days execution of sententences were barred by Presidential
Decree 1316); Se Aceleran los Tiempos de la Corte para Resolver el Corralon, supra note 107
(describing how Duhalde, in his last week, issued Presidential Decree 1316 with intent
of braking the draining of resources occurring via judicial decisions which threatened
the reserves of banks to point of bankruptcy).
122. See Nat'l Ombudsman, Banking Restrictions, supra note 78 (explaining that
Ombudsman had initiated complaint on behalf of all people with savings in Argentine
banking system).
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tions. 12' The National Ombudsman challenged the constitution-
ality of the Decree.1 24 The Supreme Court found that the De-
cree violated the constitutional right to private property, 125 right
to access to the courts. 12 6 Thus, the interaction between the ex-
ecutive and judicial branches illustrates that although the courts
may uphold the reparation recipients' property, rights, the exec-
utive branch may not heed its decision. 1
27
B. International Caselaw Interpreting Right to Reparations in Context
of International Tribunal and Extraterritorial Litigation in
United States District Court
1. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights
Cases, such as the Veldsquez Rodiguez case, affirm that the
atrocities suffered by the victims of the Dirty War were violations
of international law and therefore proper cases for the consider-
123. See Denounced Threats, supra note 109 (explaining that effect of Presidential
Decree constituted denial of access to courts); see also Nuevo decreto obliga a devolver los
ahorros en manzo, supra note 107 (explaining how Presidential Decree 1316 suspended
execution of sentences dictated by Judges against the bank freeze for 120 days); Se
aceleran los tiempos de la Corte para resolver el corralon, supra note 107 (noting that Duhalde
issued Presidential Decree 1316 with intent of braking the draining of resources occur-
ring via judicial decisions which threatened the reserves of banks to point of bank-
ruptcy).
124. See Denounced Threats, supra note 109 (showing that Ombudsman's role is to
protect citizen's rights and access to courts). See generally CONsr. ARG. pt. I, ch. I, § 86
(1994) (creating Ombudsman as independent and fully autonomous organ dedicated
to defense and protection of human rights and other Constitutional rights against acts
and ommission of Administration); Defensor del Pueblo de is Nacion, Wat is the
Ombudsman, available at www.defensor.gov.ar (last visited Mar. 9, 2005) (describing how
National Ombudsman has power to pursue investigations at request of complainant or
at his own initiative into cases originated by any agency of National Public Administra-
tion).
125. See CONST. ARG. pt. I. ch. I § 17 (1994) (prohibiting the violation of property
rights outside of legal sanction); see also MILLER ET AL., supra note 23, at 1223-33 (explor-
ing Argentine constitutional property rights).
126. See NAT'L OMBUDSMAN, DEFENSOR, supra note 17 (citing violation of Argentine
Constitution and San Jose Costa Rica Agreement as incorporated into Constitution); see
also Denounced Threats, supra note 109 (explaining that Presidential Decree denied
access to courts); Nuevo decreto obliga a devolver los ahorros en marzo, supra note 107 (ex-
plaining how Presidential Decree 1316 suspended execution of sentences dictated by
Judges against the bank freeze for one hundred and twenty days).
127. See Denounced Threats, supra note 109 (explaining that Presidential Decree
denied access to courts); see also Nuevo decreto obliga a devolver los ahorros en marzo, supra
note 107 (explaining how Presidential Decree 1316 suspended execution of sentences
dictated by judges against the bank freeze for 120 days).
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ation of international human rights tribunals. 128 The Velasquez
Rodriguez case considered by the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights ("IACHR") provides a relevant investigation of in-
ternational law, both customary and conventional, regarding the
recent phenomenon of disappearance as a systematic human
rights abuse. 129 The Court declared that holding abducted peo-
ple without judicial scrutiny or an official charge, deprives them
of their life, liberty, and due process in violation of Article 4,
Article 5, and Article 7 of the American Convention.13 0 Further-
more, the IACHR found that the treatment associated with their
custody constituted cruel and inhuman treatment, and noted
that the victims prolonged isolation and deprivation of commu-
nication insulted the personhood and dignity of the detainee. 13 1
Under this reasoning, the IACHR maintained that the detention
itself violated of Article 5 of the Convention. 132 Additionally, the
forces that abducted the person often summarily executed them
128. See, e.g., In re Veldsquez Rodriguez, [1988] Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 4,
149-90 (holding that torture was violation of law of Nations for purposes of ATCA
jurisdiction); see also Orentlicher, supra note 24, at 2576-79 (describing implication of
Veldsquez Rodriguez holding on human rights jurisprudence); Shelton, supra note 24, at
362 (asserting that Veldsquez Rodriguez case upheld jurisdiction over torture as violation
of law of Nations under ATCA).
129. See In re Veldsquez Rodriguez, [1988] Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 4, 11
149-90 (asserting that disappearance is not new human rights violation but its use to
create general state of anguish and fear is recent phenomenon); see also Orentlicher,
supra note 24, at 2576-79 (discussing Veldsquez Rodriguez decision); Shelton, supra note
24, at 362 (discussing Vel/squez Rodriguez case and its implications on Inter-American
Court's jurisprudence).
130. See Veldsquez Rodriguez, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 4, 186-88 (describ-
ing how Velasquez Rodriguez, as victim of arbitrary detention, was deprived of liberty,
humane treatment, and life in violation of Article 4, 5, and 7 of Convention); see also
Orentlicher, supra note 24, at 2576-79 (describing how Inter-American Court held Ve-
lIsquez Rodriguez's rights were violated), Shelton, supra note 24, at 159 (stating that
Inter-American Court found government in power at time had violated Veldsquez Rod-
riguez's rights to liberty, life, and humane treatment).
131. See Veldsquez Rodriguez, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 4, 187 (identifying
plaintiff's disappearance as violation of right to personal integrity enshrined in Article 5
of Convention); see also Orentlicher, supra note 24, at 2576-79 (illustrating how Inter-
American Court held Honduran government responsible for victim's disappearance
and presumed death); Shelton, supra note 24, at 362 (stating that victim's rights were
violated).
132. See Veldsquez Rodriguez, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 4, 11 186-87 (asserting
that detention constitutes failure on part of Honduras to guarantee respect of such
rights under Article 1); see also American Convention on Human Rights, art. 5(2), Nov.
22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 (establishing that torture, cruel, inhuman, and degrading
treatment is forbidden and that prisoners shall be treated with respect to inherent
human dignity).
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in flagrant violation of the right to life recognized in Article 4 of
the Convention.133
The IACHR also held that the Convention bound the Hon-
duran government regardless of the fact that the crime occurred
unbeknownst to some members of government, and did not re-
sult from official orders. 134 The court specifically affirmed the
government's obligation to fulfill the requirements of the Ameri-
can Convention regardless of changes of government over a time
period.1 35 Thus, the Court resolved the question of successor ob-
ligation for parties to the American Convention.1 36 The repara-
tion recipients could seek a remedy before an international tri-
bunal because others who have suffered similar atrocities have
succeeded there.1 37 However, any decision of international tri-
133. See Veldsquez Rodriguez, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 4, 188 (establishing
that although his fate was not known, context in which he was disappeared creates
reasonable presumption that he was killed in violation of Article 4 of Convention); see
also American Convention on Human Rights, art. 4, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123
(upholding right to life).
134. See Veldsquez Rodriguez, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 4, 1 183 (affirming
continuous State responsibility in area of human rights even if new government is more
respectful of such rights than government in power when they occurred); see also Oren-
tlicher, supra note 24, at 2577 (describing how States' duties under Convention persist
even if government in power at time is different from that in power at time violation
occurred).
135. See Veldsquez Rodriguez, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 4, 184 (explaining
that government responsibility exists independently of changes in government over pe-
riod of time); see also Orentlicher, supra note 24, at 2576-79 (discussing Velasquez Rodri-
guez holding that government responsibility persists even though government in power
at time of disappearances was no longer in power); Shelton, supra note 24, at 159 (dis-
cussing Veldsquez Rodriguez case and its implications for Inter-American Court's jurispru-
dence).
136. See Veldsquez Rodriguez, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 4, 184 (upholding
obligations to American Convention regardless of changes of government); see also
Orentlicher, supra note 24, at 2576-79 (discussing fact that changes in government do
not abdicate responsibility for crimes); Shelton, supra note 24, at 159 (discussing Velds-
quez Rodriguez case's holding that subsequent regimes may be responsible for remedying
prior crimes).
137. See, e.g., Filartiga v. Pefia-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 878 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding that
torture was violation of laws of Nations within meaning of Statute and that suit was not
barred by Act of State doctrine); Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 241-44 (2d Cir. 1996)
(analyzing if actions committed by Bosnian-Serb Karadzic constitute violations of law of
Nations for purposes of ATCA). But see CARTER & TRiMBLE, supra note 77, at 849-50
(describing that human rights law is dependent on voluntary compliance by States be-
cause most States have not submitted to international courts that hear human rights
disputes, because such courts are mostly open to States not individuals and because
even if such courts issue a binding judgment, there is no international police force to
enforce their decision).
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bunal would have to be enforced ultimately by a domestic court
system."'
2. ATCA Cases Upholding Victims Right to
Receive Reparations
The reparation bond recipients from the Dirty War may suc-
ceed under the ATCA, because similar plaintiffs have pre-
vailed.' 39 The courts considering the Filartiga v. Pefia-Irala and
Kadic v. Karadzic concluded that crimes similar to the Dirty War
atrocities qualified as violations of the law of Nations for the pur-
poses of the ATCA."4 ° For example, the plaintiffs in Filartiga
sued in the United States under the ATCA alleging that Pena-
Irala was responsible for the torture and disappearance of their
son in Paraguay. 4 ' The U.S. Second Circuit, in a landmark deci-
sion, held that the United States had jurisdiction when a non-
138. See STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 87 (describing how the Inter-Amercian
Human Rights Committee has no binding authority); see also CARTER & TRIMBLE, supra
note 77, 849-50 (describing that human rights law is dependent on voluntary compli-
ance and has no binding authority).
139. See Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 878 (wherein victims of torture prevailed under
ATCA); see also Karadzic, 70 F.3d at 24144 (holding that plaintiffs, victims of torture,
should prevail against perpetrators under ATCA).
140. See Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1993) (establishing original juris-
diction in U.S. district courts for non-U.S. citizens suing on torts in violation of law of
Nations); see also Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 878 (holding torture to be violation of law of
Nations); Karadzic 70 F.3d at 232-40 (discussing definition of violation of law of Nations
for ATCA purposes); Collingsworth, supra note 87, at 186-87 (describing how Filartiga
was first to present long dormant ATCA as means to enforce international human rights
standards through U.S. federal courts); Lutz & Sikkink, supra note 87, at 8-9, 31 (stating
that success of Filartiga provided U.S. human rights lawyers with new avenues for en-
forcement of human rights norms, but that in Argentina there has been little success in
executing judgments for civil damages awarded in human rights trials abroad); STEINER
& ALSTON, supra note 87, at 1049 (discussing fact that Filartiga gave new life to ATCA
and has been used as reference point in over 100 cases); Stephens, supra note 87, at
596-98 (describing how post-Filartiga cases have expanded those who can be held re-
sponsible for violations of law of Nations to include those in charge of planning of
abuses as well).
141. See Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1993) (establishing original juris-
diction in U.S. district courts for non-U.S. citizens suing on torts in violation of law of
Nations); see also Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 876 (resolving case brought by citizens of Para-
guay against one allegedly responsible for torture and disappearance of their son); Col-
lingsworth, supra note 87, at 186-87 n.14 (describing how torture claim was brought
against former official of government of Paraguay, thereby avoiding need to conduct
State action analysis because defendant was member of government); Lutz & Sikkink,
supra note 87, at 8 (stating that plaintiffs were Dr. Joel Filartiga and his daughter Dolly,
who alleged that Joelito was kidnapped in order to pressure Dr. Filartiga to end his
political activities); Stevens, supra note 87, at 594-95 (stating that case involved murder
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citizen sues an alleged torturer found and served within U.S.
borders. 14 2 Further, the Court in Kadic also addressed the ques-
tion of whether torture violated the customary law of Nations. 143
There, the Court held that rape, torture, and summary execu-
tion violated international law when committed by State officials
under color of law.144 The court established that torture violated
customary international law despite the fact that an unrecog-
nized State perpetrated the act. 14 5
Despite the fact that the underlying atrocities present in the
reparation recipients' claims are similar to those present in Filar-
tiga and Karadzic, they would also have to overcome the jurisdic-
tional hurdles of the Act of State and the FSIA.14 6 Republic of
Argentina & Banco Central de La Republica Argentina v. Weltover,
of Joelito Filartiga who was seventeen when tortured to death in Paraguay by police
officer).
142. See Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 241-44 (holding that non-citizens could sue in United
States under ATCA for violations of law of Nations); see also Collingsworth, supra note
87, at 186-87 (describing how Filartiga held torture was violation of law of Nations); Lutz
& Sikkink, supra note 87, at 8-9 (discussing implications of Filartiga on human rights
jurisprudence); STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 87, at 1049 (discussing fact that Filartiga
gave new life to ATCA and has been used as reference point in over 100 cases); Ste-
phens, supra note 87, at 596-98 (describing how post-Filartiga cases have expanded those
who can be held responsible for violations of law of Nations to include those in charge
of planning of abuses as well).
143. See Karadzic, 70 F.3d at 232-40 (analyzing if actions committed by Bosnian-
Serb Karadzic constitute violations of law of Nations for purposes of ATCA); see also
Collingsworth, supra note 87, at 198 (describing how court held that genocide and war
crimes were actionable irrespective of State action); Stephens, supra note 87, at 598
(describing how court found that international law's State action requirement does not
necessitate action by recognized State).
144. See Karadzic, 70 F.3d at 243 (holding that Bosnian-Serb leader's actions plan-
ning and ordering campaign of murder, rape, forced impregnation, and other forms of
torture were violations of international law within meaning of ATCA); see also Colling-
sworth, supra note 87, at 198 (stating that certain crimes, whether under auspices of
State action or not, violate law of Nations); Stephens, supra note 87, at 598 (describing
how court found Karadzic's could be liable for genocide even if acting as purely private
citizen).
145. See Karadzic, 70 F.3d at 245 (holding that customary international law of
human rights proscribes torture committed by State actors regardless of whether they
are recognized or unrecognized); see also Collingsworth, supra note 87, at 202 (stating
that one key problem to ATCA's usefulness as tool for enforcing human rights norms is
that "law of [N]ations" is necessarily narrow in scope); Stephens, supra note 87, at 598
(accentuating fact that basic norms of humanitarian law apply to all parties to war
whether international or internal).
146. See, e.g., Republic of Argentina & Banco Central de La Republica Argentina v.
Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 609 (1992) (identifying issue of whether Argentina's deci-
sion to reschedule its bonds qualified as commercial activity exception of FSIA); Un-
derhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252-254 (1897) (asserting that out of respect for
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Inc. addressed the issue of sovereign immunity while challenging
Argentina's decision to reschedule bonds in the U.S. Federal
Court. 1 4 7  There, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed various
challenges to jurisdiction of foreign sovereign immunity.148 The
Court concluded that under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act ("FSIA"), Argentina's issuance and rescheduling of bonds
fell within the commercial activity exception because Argentina
was participating in the bond market as a private actor.'49 In
order to find a commercial activity exception under the FSIA the
Court needed to find that the issuance of the bonds had a direct
effect in the United States.' 5 ° The Court held that because Ar-
gentina had to make the debt payments in the United States they
sovereignty U.S. courts will not tolerate suits brought against those acting with govern-
mental authority within borders of their Nations).
147. See Weltover, 504 U.S. at 609 (identifying issue of whether Argentina's decision
to reschedule its bonds qualified as commercial activity exception of FSIA); see also
David E. Gohlke, Clearing the Air or Muddying the Waters? Defining "A Direct Effect in the
United States" Under the Foreign sovereign Immunities Act After Republic of Argentina v.
Weltover, 18 Hous.J. INT'L L. 261, 279-87 (1995) (discussing Weltover decision); Avi Lew,
Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc.: Interpreting the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act's Com-
mercial Activity Exception to Juridsictional Immunity, 17 FoRDHAM INT'L LJ. 726, 741-65
(1994) (discussing implications of Weltover on understanding of commercial activity ex-
ception to FSIA); Silverman & Deveno, supra note 19, at 187 n.48 (asserting that
Weltover implies limited U.S. jurisdiction).
148. See Weltover, 504 U.S. at 609 (identifying issue of whether Argentina's decision
to reschedule its bonds qualified as commercial activity exception of FSIA, as defined in
Section 1605(a) (2)); see also Gohlke, supra note 147, at 279-87 (discussing rational for
analysis of commercial activity exception); Lew, supra note 147, at 741-65 (analyzing
applicability of commercial activity exception); Silverman & Deveno, supra note 19, at
187 n.48 (discussing impact of Weltover decision).
149. See Weltover, 504 U.S. at 617 (holding that regardless of purpose of issuance of
bonds, Argentina participated in bond market as private actor and was therefore not
protected by FSIA); see also Gohlke, supra note 147, at 279-87 (analyzing impact of pri-
vate actors on FSIA); Lew, supra note 147, at 741-65 (exploring commercial activity
exception analysis in Weltover); Silverman & Deveno, supra note 19, at 187 n.48 (analyz-
ing Weltover decision's holding on commercial activity exception).
150. See U.S. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (1976)
(providing that foreign States will be immune from jurisdiction of U.S. courts subject to
enumerated exceptions); see also Weltover, 504 U.S. at 617-619 (analyzing whether
rescheduling of bonds had direct effect in United States). See generally STEINER & AL-
STON, supra note 87, at 1060 (describing how foreign States are immune from suit sub-
ject to exceptions which include court actions arising out of State's commercial activi-
ties in United States and actions involving expropriated property); Siderman de Blake
v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699 (9th Cir.1992) (finding Argentina immune from
suit under FSIA because although Argentina's official acts of torture violated interna-
tional law, they were not one of exceptions enumerated in FSIA); Saudi Arabia v. Nel-
son, 507 U.S. 349 (1993) (granting sovereign immunity to Saudi Arabia because unlaw-
ful detention and torture did not fall within FSIA exceptions).
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had a direct effect within the meaning of the FSIA.15' Thus, the
jurisdictional challenges asserted by Argentina failed. 52  The
Court did not address whether jurisdiction would exist over Ar-
gentina if the obligated to pay existed solely outside of the
United States.153
Another defense that Argentina may have against an ATCA
claim is the Act of State Doctrine.'54 The Act of State Doctrine
provides that courts will not inquire into the official acts of inde-
pendent sovereigns that occur within their own borders.155 The
U.S. Supreme Court in Underhill v. Hernandez refused to investi-
gate allegations against one side of the Venezuelan civil war
based on the Act of State Doctrine.5 6 The Court later affirmed
151. See Weltover, 504 U.S. at 617-619 (asserting that Argentina's unilateral decision
to reschedule payments of bonds that were to occur in United States constituted direct
effect); see also Gohlke, supra note 147, at 279-87 (discussing rationale for analysis of
commercial activity exception); Lew, supra note 147, at 741-65 (analyzing applicability
of commercial activity exception); Silverman & Deveno, supra note 19, at 187 n.48 (dis-
cussing impact of Weltover decision).
152. See Weltover, 504 U.S. at 619-620 (holding Argentina not immune from suit
because its issuance of bonds was commercial activity under FSIA and its rescheduling
of bonds was in connection with that activity and had direct effect in United States); see
also Gohlke, supra note 147, at 279-87 (discussing how Weltover decision held Argentina
responsible); Lew, supra note 147, at 741-65 (discussing how Weltover decision found
Argentina within commercial activity exception); Silverman & Deveno, supra note 19, at
note 48 (stating significance of Weltover decision on exploration of commercial activity
exception).
153. See Silverman & Deveno, supra note 19, at 187 n.48 (asserting that Weltover
implies that no U.S. federal jurisdiction exists in cases involving foreign sovereign obli-
gated to pay solely outside United States). See generally Gohlke, supra note 147, at 279-87
(exploring effects of Weltover decision and arguing that its broad application of direct
effects test was inappropriate); Lew, supra note 147, at 741-65 (arguing it was impossible
to further define commercial activity within meaning of FSIA in way that would have
ceased all debate on issue).
154. See Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252-54 (1897) (announcing that
the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of another government
conducted within its own territory). See generally STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 87, at
1058-59 (discussing how Act of State Doctrine is aimed at avoiding potential judicial
interference with conduct of foreign relations and forbids courts of country to sit in
judgment of acts of other countries' governments done within their own territory);
Donald T. Kramer, Modern Status of the Act of State Doctrine, 12 A.L.R. FED. 707, 715-16
(1972) (stating that Underhill is classic U.S. statement of Act of State Doctrine).
155. See generally Kirgis, supra note 88 (describing Act of State Doctrine as that
which prohibits countries to review decisions of other States regarding matters within
their own borders); Kramer, supra note 154, at 715-16 (exploring the historical develop-
ment of Act of State Doctrine in U.S. case law).
156. See Underhill 168 U.S. at 252-54 (asserting that out of respect for sovereignty
U.S. courts will not tolerate suits brought against those acting with governmental au-
thority within borders of their Nations). See generally Kirgis, supra note 88 (identifying
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this principle in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino when it re-
fused to investigate the validity of a taking of property within
Cuba by Cuba's sovereign government.' v The Court stated that
it would not investigate such takings even if the plaintiff alleged
violations of customary international law."5 8 Finally, the Allied
Bank Int'l v. Banco Creditor Agricola de Cartago decision addressed
the argument that because a non-U.S. Nation's decision to sus-
pend payments on bonds occurred within its borders, it was an
Act of State and not available for judicial review in the United
States. 159  There, the Court held that, since the bondholders
were abroad, the taking occurred abroad, where the obligation
to pay resided. 160
The reparation recipients have suffered losses similar to
other plaintiffs who have prevailed under the ATCA. 16' Further-
that countries are forbidden from reviewing decisions of other States regarding matters
within their own borders under Act of State Doctrine); Kramer, supra note 154, at 715-
16 (describing evolution of doctrine that sovereign States are bound to respect inde-
pendence of other sovereigns).
157. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428 (1964) (asserting
that Act of State Doctrine does not forbid inquiry into extraterritorial takings). But see
Allied Bank Int'l v. Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago, 757 F.2d 516, 521 (1985) (dis-
cussing Act of State Doctrine and cautioning that Supreme Court has been reticent to
create inflexible rule and instead affirms need to apply case by case approach tempered
by common sense).
158. See Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 428 (stating that sovereignty should be respected
regardless of assertions of violations of customary international law); see also S.W.
O'Donnell, Antitrust Subject Matter Jurisdiction Over State Owned Enterprises and the End of
Prudential Prophylactic Judicial Doctrines, 26 Suiwou TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 247, 279-80
(2003) (discussing how Sabbatino holding demanded judicial deference in examining
government seizure of property); Tracie A. Sundack, Republic of Philippines v. Marcos:
The Ninth Circuit Allows a Former Ruler to Invoke the Act of State Doctrine Against a Resisting
Sovereign, 38 AM. U.L. REv. 225, 233-34 (1998) (describing how Sabbatino decision con-
cluded that U.S. courts could not pass judgment on foreign State's acts).
159. See Allied Bank Int'l, 757 F.2d at 520-22 (exploring Act of State Doctrine in
context of bond issuance abroad); see also James Finnigan, Sovereign Default in United
States Courts: The Interrelationship of the Articles of the International Monetary Fund, the Act of
State Doctrine and Commity Principles: Allied Bank International v. Banco Credito de Cartago, 4
B.U. INT'L L.J. 153, 198-99 (1986) (stating that Allied Bank Int'l decision failed to con-
sider applicability of Articles of IMF); Sundack, supra note 158, at 228 n.14 (identifying
the historical background of the Act of State Doctrine).
160. See Allied Bank Int'l, 757 F.2d at 521 (holding that "situs of property" was in
United States); see also Finnigan, supra note 159, at 158-61 (discussing rationale of Allied
Bank Int'l decision); Sundack, supra note 158, at 228 n.14 (stating that Allied Bank Int'l
cited link between Act of State Doctrine and sovereign immunity).
161. See Filartiga v. Pefia-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 878 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding that tor-
ture was violation of laws of Nations within meaning of Statute and that suit was not
barred by Act of State doctrine); Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 24144 (2d Cir. 1996)
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more, the precedent of Weltover makes clear that States are re-
sponsible under ATCA if their actions fall into the commercial
activity exception of the FSIA. 162 Thus, the remedy of suit under
ATCA, though fraught with challenges, is a possible remedy for
the reparation recipients.
1 63
III. ANALYSIS OF EFFICACY OF REMEDIES TO
REPARATIONS RECIPIENTS
Oesterheld and Garcia-Albores have four avenues present-
ing a remedy for their outstanding right to receive reparations:
domestic courts, 1 64 international tribunals,1 65 extrajudicial litiga-
tion, 1 6 6 and sovereign debt negotiations. 16  This Note, in Part
III, will explore these four alternatives in search of the best ap-
proach for the vindication of their right to reparations. The
most likely remedy for the reparation recipients is one through
the field of sovereign debt negotiations.1 68 Therefore, these ne-
(affirming that torture was violation of law of Nations and thus adequate cause of action
under ATCA).
162. See Republic of Argentina & Banco Central de La Republica Argentina v.
Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 619-20 (1992) (holding Argentina not immune from suit
because its issuance of bonds was commercial activity under FSIA and its rescheduling
of bonds was in connection with that activity and had direct effect in United States); see
also Gohlke, supra note 147, at 279-87 (stating that Weltover decision held Argentina
subject to suit); Lew, supra note 147, at 741-65 (analyzing applicability of commercial
activity exception); Silverman & Deveno, supra note 19, at 187 n.48 (discussing impact
of Weltover decision).
163. See, e.g., Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 878 (establishing that torture constituted viola-
tion of law of Nations for purposes of ATCA litigation); Kadic, 70 F.3d at 241-44 (finding
jurisdiction over torture crimes committed in violation of law of Nations); Weltover, 504
U.S. at 619-20 (holding Argentina not immune from suit because its issuance of bonds
was commercial activity under FSIA and its rescheduling of bonds was in connection
with that activity and had direct effect in United States); Gohlke, supra note 147, at 279-
87 (stating that Weltover decision held Argentina subject to suit); Lew, supra note 147, at
741-65 (analyzing applicability of commercial activity exception); Silverman & Deveno,
supra note 19, at 187 n.48 (discussing impact of Weltover decision).
164. See supra notes 82-86 and accompanying text (discussing Argentine Constitu-
tional law upholding reparation recipients' rights).
165. See supra notes 83, 129-36 and accompanying text (describing incorporation
of international treaties into Argentine Constitution and discussing case law before In-
ter-American Court of Human Rights).
166. See supra notes 87-89, 139-63 and accompanying text (exploring ATCA and its
jurisdictional hurdles and illustrating case law upholding right to receive reparations).
167. See supra note 26 and accompanying text (discussing field of sovereign debt
negotiations).
168. See supra notes 56-64 and accompanying text (illustrating complex state of
sovereign debt negotiations facing reparation recipients).
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gotiations should respect the fact that the Argentine State owes
the reparation recipients a different debt than it owes to the
other normal investors.16 9
A. Domestic Remedy
1. The Supreme Court's Holding on the Bank
Freeze Legislation
The declaration of unconstitutionality by the Argentine Su-
preme Court on the Bank Freezing Legislation held that the
pesification of individuals' savings accounts violated of the right
to property established in the Argentine Constitution. 70 In the
Bank Freeze Cases the Court was considering bank accounts that
the government had devalued by 50%.171 The government's pol-
icies regarding the reparation bonds initially devalued them at a
rate of 66% and later ceased making any payments of interest or
principal to the bondholders at all.172 Thus, under the prece-
dent established by the Court's ruling on the Bank Freeze Legis-
lation, Oesterheld, and other reparation recipients, would have
a strong legal argument for a violation of constitutionally pro-
tected property rights.
2. The Court's Interpretation of Article 17 and Relevant
United States Authority
Furthermore, as the aforementioned exploration of Argen-
tine Constitutional case law indicates, property rights covered by
Article 17 of the Constitution may only be violated under author-
ity of law with prior notice, hearing and compensation provided
to the property owner. 17' Thus, there is a solid legal precedent
for the argument that the government has violated Oesterheld's
property rights.
169. See supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text (stating that reparation recipi-
ents are different from normal creditors due unique circumstances of issuance).
170. See supra notes 107-20 and accompanying text (describing court's holding that
government's pesification was restriction on property rights that had exceeded accept-
able limit established by Constitution).
171. See supra notes 108-10 and accompanying text (describing court review of
pesification, comprising 1.4 Argentine pesos to one U.S. dollar).
172. See supra notes 12-18 and accompanying text (illustrating impact of economic
crisis on value of bonds).
173. See supra notes 97-104 and accompanying text (discussing property rights en-
shrined in Constitution of the Argentine Nation Part I, Chapter I, Section 17, and
caselaw interpreting it to protect property rights from violations).
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3. The Likelihood of an Effective Domestic Remedy
Unfortunately, as the reaction of the Presidency to the hold-
ing on the Bank Freeze Legislation illustrates, if the Court were
to find that Oesterheld's property rights had been violated, ei-
ther in accordance with traditional interpretations of Article 17
property rights, or under the precedent of the Bank Freeze deci-
sion, the other branches of government will not necessarily heed
their holding.174 Additionally, though Oesterheld has right to
receive reparations established by the treaties incorporated in
Section 75/22, the Argentine Court has been conservative in its
integration of these new rights into the Constitutional system,
interpreting the language of Section 75/22 as only affirming
new rights that harmonize with traditional constitutional
rights. a75 Thus, Section 75/22 as interpreted by the Court does
not provide an independent right for Oesterheld outside of her
traditional constitutional protections. 176
B. The Efficacy of International Tribunal
The efficacy of a decision rendered by the Inter-American
Court or an opinion published by the U.N. Committee ulti-
mately hinges on whether or not Argentina is disposed to follow-
ing the holding of the international body. 177 If Oesterheld ob-
tained a judgment from the Inter-American Court, she would
have to rely on the domestic courts to enforce it.178 Since the
domestic courts are having difficulties enforcing their own deci-
sions, it is not likely that Oesterheld will obtain a meaningful
174. See supra note 121-27 and accompanying text (describing how executive
branch responded to Supreme Court's holding by not following it but by issuing Presi-
dential decree banning Court from considering other similar cases).
175. See supra notes 99-100 and accompanying text (stating that interpretation of
Section 75/22 renders international human rights law only effective to extent that they
harmonize with traditional constitutional fights).
176. See supra notes 99-100 and accompanying text (illustrating that conservative
interpretation of Section 75/22 creates no new rights).
177. See supra notes 137-38 and accompanying text (describing that human rights
law is dependent on voluntary compliance by States because most States have not sub-
mitted to international courts that hear human rights disputes, because such courts are
mostly open to States not individuals and because even if such courts issue binding
judgment there is no international police force to enforce their decision).
178. See supra notes 137-38 and accompanying text (discussing how human rights
law is dependent on voluntary compliance because even if courts issue a binding judg-
ment they still must rely on domestic courts to enforce it).
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remedy by asking them to enforce an international decision."v9
C. ATCA Remedy
The ATCA is an option for the reparation recipients like
Oesterheld but it presents jurisdictional impediments.' The
suit might be dismissed because of the FSIA's commercial excep-
tion requires a direct effect on the United States which would be
difficult to establish."8 ' Additionally, under the Act of State Doc-
trine the plaintiffs could only sue if the government was obliged
to pay the bonds to plaintiffs outside the territory of Argen-
tina. l" 2 Finally, even if reparation recipients were successful in
the United States they would still have to get the judgment effec-
tuated in Argentina, which could prove difficult."8 3 Considering
that litigating abroad is expensive in terms of time, money and
travel inconvenience, bringing such a risky suit may not be a
meaningful remedy for Oesterheld 84
D. Sovereign Debt Negotiations
It is most likely that Oesterheld's bonds will be part of a
settlement the Argentine government brokers with its various
creditors.1 8 5 Thus, the most efficacious avenue for a remedy for
Oesterheld lies in the changing field of sovereign debt negotia-
tions.18 6 Though many groups have offered proposals to address
179. See supra note 87 (identifying various jurisdictional hurdles involved in ATCA
suits).
180. See supra note 87 (describing various jurisdictional hurdles involved in ATCA
suits).
181. See supra note 87 and accompanying text (stating that commercial exception
to FSIA demands action contested have direct effect within United States).
182. See supra note 87 and accompanying text (illustrating how Act of State Doc-
trine keeps U.S. courts from reviewing decisions of sovereign States regarding rhatters
strictly within their own borders).
183. See supra notes 137-38 and accompanying text (discussing how international
law is dependent on voluntary compliance because even if courts issue binding judg-
ment they still must rely on domestic courts to enforce it).
184. See supra notes 53-65 and accompanying text (describing financial difficulties
of reparation bond recipients).
185. See supra notes 57-65 and accompanying text (stating that diverse group of
bondholders are mostly resorting to efforts at negotiation with Argentine Government
and forgoing option of litigation).
186. See supra notes 57-65 and accompanying text (illustrating how litigation has
become less fruitful due to fact that sovereigns often do not have sufficient assets in any
one jurisdiction for attachment, creating greater reliance on sovereign debt negotia-
tions).
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the changing face of sovereign debt, in Oesterheld and Garcia-
Albores' case the proposals must address their unique status, be-
cause neither'8 7 is a voluntary investor in the Argentine State.' 88
Oesterheld, Garcia-Albores, and the other reparation bond re-
cipients, were victims of crimes against their families and loved
ones. 8 9 As such, the government must treat them in a way that
acknowledges the profound continuing obligation that the Ar-
gentine State owes them.' 90
1. New Proposals in Sovereign Debt Negotiations
Whereas large commercial banks with similar interests used
to primarily hold sovereign debt, now diverse groups of bond-
holders hold the majority of sovereign debt.' Thus, despite the
fact that litigation used to be a desirable way of handling sover-
eign debt defaults, is now impracticable due to the diverse inter-
ests of the creditors." 2 Due to the new diverse character of the
debt holders, voluntary restructuring has taken on a new signifi-
cance.'93 In light of this, several new proposals have been put
forth to allow the field of sovereign debt negotiation to respond
to this changing characteristic.'
94
187. See supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text (stating that reparation bond-
holders should be treated differently than other normal investors due to unique and
involuntary origin of reparation bonds).
188. See supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text (commenting that reparation
bondholders should be treated differently than other normal investors due to unique
and involuntary origin of reparation bonds).
189. See supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text (describing how reparation
bond holders, in stark contrast to all other bond holders, are not investors but victims
of crimes).
190. See supra note 64 and accompanying text (identifying Ombudsman's plea urg-
ing Minister of Economy to lift suspension of payments on reparation bonds because
suspending them constituted violation of American Convention and regression in de-
velopment of human rights).
191. See supra notes 57-65 and accompanying text (explaining recent trend in sov-
ereign financing away from syndicated bank loans towards great reliance on sovereign
bonds held by large number of creditors with varying concerns and interests).
192. See supra notes 57-65 and accompanying text (describing that when faced with
individual litigations by numerous bondholders sovereigns may have insufficient assets
in any jurisdiction for attachment or individual settlements and thus sovereigns may be
less likely to attempt to settle).
193. See supra notes 53-65 and accompanying text (illustrating how difficulties with
litigating sovereign debt conflicts make efforts towards consensual, collective restructur-
ings more vital).
194. See supra notes 67-74 and accompanying text (identifying various proposals
for ensuring that voluntary restructurings are transparent, predictable, and equal in
treatment of all creditors).
ARGENTINA'S REPARATION BONDS
The Jubilee Framework for International insolvency pro-
posed basing international insolvency on Chapter 9 of U.S.
Bankruptcy Code principles, creating an ad hoc body appointed
to deal with individual petitions for insolvency. 19 5 The Council
on Foreign Relations, a non-partisan, national membership or-
ganization, issued broad recommendations suggesting a volun-
tary proceeding modeled on Chapter 9 principles as well. 96 The
IMF proposed the creation of a SDRM which would address sov-
ereign debt restructuring. 197 Under the SDRM proposal certain
claims would automatically be ineligible for restructuring such as
claims held by international organizations and creditors would
approve the proposal offered by the sovereign by a super major-
ity vote binding on minority creditors.
198
2. Proposals Geared at Vindicating the Unique Debt Owed the
Reparation Recipients
Those reparation bond holders are creditors because they
and their families were first victims of human rights abuses and
should be treated as a preferred class whose claims areineligible
for restructuring. 199 In this way, the Argentine State can ac-
knowledge the debt owed to them, both financial and moral.200
Additionally, this approach would enable the government to ad-
vance the reconciliation process, begun so long ago, rather that
degenerate it. 20 1
195. See supra note 67-74 and accompanying text (describing proposal based on
Chapter 9 involving ad hoc dispute resolution committees).
196. See supra notes 67-74 and accompanying text (identifying proposals discussed
at roundtable concerning sovereign debt).
197. See supra note 68 and accompanying text (stating that at annual meeting of
World Bank and IMF in September of 2002, IMFC requested that IMF develop frame-
work for sovereign debt).
198. See supra note 71 and accompanying text (stating provisions regarding vot-
ing).
199. See supra notes 20, 63-65, 75 and accompanying text (identifying argument
that reparation recipients should not be treated as normal investors due to unique na-
ture of their bond's issuance).
200. See supra notes 20, 63-65, 75 and accompanying text (arguing that obligation
owed reparation recipients is moral in addition to financial due to Dirty War atrocities
suffered).
201. See supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text (stating that suspending pay-
ment on reparation bonds constituted violation of American Convention and regres-
sion in development of human rights).
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CONCLUSION
Since the international community is in accord that torture
and forced disappearance are an abomination to all, and that
those victims have a right to compensation for these horrendous
crimes, then the reparations bonds should not be left devalued
and suspended, for what is a right without a remedy? Nor
should the Argentine government renegotiate them as if the
Dirty War victims were normal investors.
Torture and forced disappearance are violations of interna-
tional law both customary and conventional. There is an inter-
nationally recognized right to reparations for such violations of
international law. The Argentine government owed reparations
to those victims of the previous regime's crimes. It acknowl-
edged this obligation by issuing the reparations bonds. Its obli-
gation is outstanding due to the devaluation, suspension, and
renegotiation of payment on the reparations bonds.
Despite the complexity of the sovereign debt crisis and its
accompanying economic crisis, the Argentine society and gov-
ernment owes to the families of the disappeared a unique and
profound obligation that surpasses monetary investments.
Therefore, in honor of the suffering of the victims and their fam-
ilies, and in support of the reconciliation process, the Argentine
government should give this obligation first priority. The reme-
dies within the Argentine Court system are not likely to produce
a meaningful result. The international tribunals have only per-
suasive authority. Jurisdictional challenges render extraterrito-
rial options difficult and expensive. Sovereign debt negotiations
seem the most likely place to seek a remedy. However, the nego-
tiation should prioritize these bonds as a preferred class or as
debt ineligible for restructuring. This approach would properly
acknowledge Argentina's continuing obligation.
